【お知らせ】KUASU公開セミナー（4/14, 21, 28 Prof. Mark SIDERITS)

アジア研究教育ユニットでは、以下のとおり公開連続セミナーを開催します。
場所：京都大学文学部東館2階257号室「KUASU多目的室」(KUASU Meeting Room 257, Faculty of Letters East Bldg., Kyoto University)
講師：Prof.Mark SIDERITS(Seoul National University)
日時・タイトル：下記の通り

April 14   (MON),  2014  14 : 45 ～16 : 15

1. Physicalism and Consciousness: classical Indian and current perspectives on the problem of phenomenality Physicalism is the view that reality is wholly physical in nature. While physicalism is widely accepted by philosophers today, it was rejected by almost all classical Indian philosophers. A major challenge for physicalists is to explain the phenomenal character of conscious mental states–the fact that there is something it is like for the subject to be in a conscious state such as the state of smelling a rose. While Indian Buddhists are not physicalists, their doctrine of non-self gives them a reason to reject the appeal to phenomenality as an objection to physicalism. This presentation will explore some facets of the current debate over physicalism as well as the classical Indian debate over the self, and some ways in which the two debates are connected.

April 21   (MON),  2014  14 : 45 ～16 : 15

2. Self-Representation Theories of Consciousness Suppose we agreed that phenomenality is the hallmark of consciousness. What is it for a mental state to be a conscious state? One view is that all and only mental states that represent themselves are conscious. In this presentation we explore the self-representation approach and a related Indian Buddhist theory that claims every cognition must cognize itself. A difficulty for any self-representation view is that just as a fingertip cannot touch itself, so it seems a cognition should not be able to cognize itself. Are there ways a self-representation theory might get around this problem?

April 28   (MON),  2014  14 : 45 ～ 16 : 15

3. Reductionist Alternatives to Self-Representation Reductionism about consciousness is the view that a conscious mental state just is some other sort of state, such as a brain state. It is widely agreed that the mind-brain identity theory–the theory that a mental state is identical with some brain state–must be rejected. But the Buddhist understanding of reductionism offers a way around this problem. This presentation explores some ways in which this and other Indian philosophical resources might be used to develop a physicalist alternative to the self-representation view.

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