Ethics for a New Society: Nishi Amane, Translation and Early Meiji Philosophy

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> [The production of a "standard language" was] a struggle for symbolic power in which what was at stake was the formation and re-formation of mental structures. In short, it was not only a question of communicating but of gaining recognition for a new language of authority, with its new political vocabulary...and the representation of the social world which it conveys."[1]
>
> Pierre Bourdieu

1. Prologue: Translation and Power

Nishi Amane (1829-1897) enjoys a legacy as the "father of Japanese philosophy," but his reputation, ironically, rests on his work as a translator, rather than as producer of deep original insight. This reputation, while broadly justified, underrates the creative process that attends translation. Nishi practiced philosophy in an era in which the intellectual crisis at hand involved assessing a vast confusion of foreign ideas, as the locus of civilization and power shifted, in Japanese eyes, from China toward Europe and America. He worked in an era of political and social crisis as the new Meiji intellectuals sought to establish the conceptual foundations of a modern society – and determine what that society and state ought to look like. In this light, translation, particularly of political and ethical works, held an obvious urgency. Nishi's was the first generation to be exposed to a significant amount of Euro-American philosophical thought and to attempt to span the intellectual gulf between it and Asian philosophical thought.

The paradigmatic challenge of translation is to convey the meaning of the source text to the receiver with the greatest possible fidelity.[2] Considering that the greatest possible fidelity consists precisely in the very words of the source text, something, it seems, must always be lost in translation. The difficulty lies not only in linguistic differences, but in the differing conceptual frameworks that languages encode. Yet a more positive approach to the practice looks to what is created in translation. While the gap of incomparability between languages and cultures threatens to frustrate the whole endeavor of translation, the able translator must somehow "bridge the incomparables," as Ricoeur expressed it, to achieve the sought-for fidelity.[3] While not denying the difficulty of cross-cultural spanning, Ricoeur nevertheless conveys the optimism that such bridges can be built.[4] The translator manages to produce an equivalence of meaning across apparently incomparable (*viz.* untranslatable)

languages by "constructing comparables" that render the culturally laden information of the text into culturally salient terms in the target language.[5]

Ricoeur's theory, privileging neither the source nor the target language, presumes that the translator's skill indeed achieves such bridging without distorting either language. Yet actual translation always entails some distortion and source languages in fact enjoy a privilege in translation that is not afforded to target languages, which means that this distortion is not borne equitably. Exactly *how* a target language is susceptible to distortion is, in part, a question of *why* the translator seeks to take the work in hand and why the target language reader seeks access to the source language work. The motive of translation, after all, governs not only the selection of what is translated, but how it is translated. The nature of the work and the social, political, economic and cultural contexts of transmission determine the aim of translation as well as the aim of consumption of the translated work. For example, in the case of colonial readership, Lydia Liu points out that the content of the information of the original language (i.e., that of the imperial power) has historically been more desirable than information flow the other way.[6] Liu, less sanguine than Ricoeur about the possibility for translation to yield true equivalencies of meaning, considers cases where the disparity between cultures also entails a disparity of power, which compels the 'receiving' culture to undertake translation in an atmosphere of crisis.[7]

In the case of Japan in the late nineteenth century, Maruyama Masao and Kato Shuichi pinpointed this phenomenon in their dialog *Translation and Japanese Modernity*, noting of the foreboding engendered by the Japanese ignorance of the West, "the result was a sense of crisis among Japanese, which drove the need to acquire more knowledge about the West. Japan responded quickly and sharply: because complete ignorance about an entity lurking right outside its gates was sure to bring trouble…."[8] Yet even here, the translators were not devoid of power, but served as the key mediators in a creative practice of internalizing and nativizing foreign concepts, while adapting local ways of thought to new terms and ideas.

This paper explores how this sense of crisis in late Tokugawa and early Meiji Japan precipitated the effort to reinterpret traditional Asian and Japanese philosophy in terms of Western philosophical ideas. Specifically, it examines the issues of language and translation that attended Nishi Amane's efforts to introduce Utilitarian ethical theory into a society that was steeped in Neo-Confucian forms of thought. Yet the story told here is not merely one of translation, but also one of "re-translation," in which new vocabulary of philosophy itself underwent contentious change at the hands of the next generations of Japanese scholars. The analysis proceeds in two steps, starting with the initial entry of "Western ethics" into Japan, focusing on Nishi's work. The analytical framework here is Liu's translingual practice. The career of *rigaku* among the late Meiji intelligentsia and its transformation into *rinrigaku*, though, require extending Liu's theory to include the contentious interplay of power and intellectuals within a society.

Until the past few decades, studies of the inter-cultural contact between Euro-American and Japanese concepts carried an Orientalizing air: concepts travelled from West to East as largely cohesive units, constituting a sort of "education" of the "receiving" cultures. Recent scholarship has sought to be more sensitive. Framing the work of the Meiji scholars such as Nishi as the "appropriation of Western philosophy," as John Maraldo does, might have the virtue of imbuing agency to the Japanese and perhaps redresses the epistemic insult intimated by the "transmission of European philosophy" (phrasing, for example used by Thomas Havens in his intellectual biography of Nishi).[9] But "appropriation" offers scant improvement over "transmission" to understand the creative challenge of translation. The process by which Japanese thinkers encountered, assessed, reconfigured and expressed concepts from other cultures entailed more than simply appropriating ideas and grafting them onto the receiving culture.

One way to intellectually re-empower the Meiji translators is to view the translingual period of the 1870s as a processual stage of reception and assessment of European and American ethical theory, as they were internalized and naturalized as part of Japanese *production* of moral theory. Translation, at this stage, was provisional, changeable and contested. The need to create new frames of reference, neologisms and changing the sense of meaning established words all contributed to translation as a supremely *generative* process. As Douglas Howland notes of these first Japanese and Chinese translators of modernity, "their translations are not authoritative, but are aimed at beginning the process of generating new textual authorities to guide the new process of Westernization in China and Japan."[10]

2. Nishi Amane : Samurai, Bureaucrat, Philosopher

Nishi Amane, it is said, "establish[ed] the fundamentals of Western learning in modern Japan."[11] Such a claim, while exaggerated, attests to his importance as a translator, educator and philosopher. Born into a samurai family in Tsuwano domain (modern Shimane prefecture, in western Honshu), he renounced his allegiance to his lord in his early 20s, committing himself to the shogunal government (*bakufu*) in Edo. The *bakufu* set the bright young man to learning Dutch, and thence to translating European and American texts that came to Japan by way of Dutch editions (thus, "Dutch studies" or *rangaku* as the general term during the Tokugawa era for the study of European and American texts). In 1863 the *bakufu* sent Nishi and another young samurai scholar on a two-year mission to the Netherlands to study Western technology and society more closely. Hosted by the University of Leiden, the two were entrusted to J.J. Hoffmann, a scholar of Japan. Shortly after arriving in Leiden, Nishi wrote to Hoffmann that his purpose was "to have Japan be able to carry on relations with the various states of Europe and reforming our domestic administration and institutions…."[12] He thus sought to learn statistics, law, economics, politics, diplomacy and French. These met his requirements as a *bakufu* emissary. To these topics, though, he added philosophy, especially the writings of Descartes, Locke, Hegel and Kant, in order to "advance our civilization." Simon Vissering, a Smithian economist

and epistemological positivist who adhered to an anti-German historical school with strong English content, taught the two Japanese scholars; Nishi supplemented Visserung's instruction with lectures in philosophy by C.W. Opzoomer, who strongly favored Comtian positivism and Millian utilitarianism.[13] Carrying out his charge to pursue knowledge on technical matters of interest to the *bakufu*, Nishi also nurtured his private interest in philosophy. In doing so, he sought to discover the underlying reasons for the West's ability to develop the technology and social order that had enabled its imperial expansion. The answer, he suspected, lay in *how* the Europeans and Americans thought; that is, in their fundamental epistemology of life's principles. As he explained in a letter to a friend,

> "It seems, I fear, that we are duplicating the mistakes of the Ching emperor…. I venture to say that this arises from the conceit of our empire, the land of the gods, and our great contempt of other countries. The portions of Western philosophy and economics that I have read have contained truly surprising theories of justice and fairness. I have learned how greatly they differ in meaning from existing studies, particularly Chinese studies…. The explanations of life's principles in the science '*philosophia'* are superior even to Sung Confucianism…."[14]

Upon his return to Japan, he served as counsel to the shogun. He declined to take an active role during the Meiji revolution, but soon found employment as a bureaucrat, head of the Translation Section of the Military Department, with the new regime once it had secured power. His advocacy of the rapid acquisition of European and American knowledge, and the refashioning of Japanese society toward achieving this end, aligned with the interests of the Meiji government. In the sixth year of the Meiji era, Nishi became a founding member of the *Meirokusha* (Meiji Six Society), which, during its short period of influence on Japanese intellectual life (1874-1876), dominated the discourse on Westernization and modernization in Japan. Nishi became its strongest voice for the adoption of Western philosophical approaches, particularly the rational empiricism exemplified by Utilitarianism.

As with many of his fellow *Meirokusha* members, Nishi considered education to be the *sine qua non* for instilling the skills, knowledge and dispositions in the next generation of Japanese that would be necessary to building national strength. It would be the site of social transformation that would allow Japan to avoid being colonized by Western powers.[15] To this end, while still working his way up the ministerial ranks, he founded a preparatory academy, the *Ikueisha*, which he ran for many years.[16] His philosophy curriculum reached back to, and built upon, his European university experience. His lecture notes, published as *Hyakugaku Renkan* (1870-71) and *Hyakuichi Shinron* (1874) consisted primarily in elaborations of his own notes from Visserung's classes. In 1877 Nishi published the first Japanese translation of J.S. Mill's *Utilitarianism* and, over the next decade, translated several European philosophy textbooks for use in his own lectures.[17]

Nishi was not alone among *Meirokusha* members in attributing Western technological superiority to effective political organization. The connection that he made to modes of thinking about ethics and knowledge, though, was debated. Sakuma Shōzan found Western ethics to be a detriment that ought not be adopted, as he famously propounded under the slogan, "Eastern morality, Western technology." Katō Hiroyuki considered Christianity to be the source of Western cultural achievement. Fukuzawa Yukichi, for his part, considered the concepts of freedom and equal rights to be the source of Western superiority.[18] Nishi was certain that empiricism and rationalism, as embodied in Utilitarianism, underlay European success. Conversely, in his view, Neo-Confucian thought continued to shackle Japanese progress.

3. The Translingual Practice of *Ri*

Nishi, as well as the other Meirokusha and Japanese Enlightenment (*keimō*) intellectuals, set his sights on dismantling Neo-Confucianism as a viable ethical construct for modern Japan. Tokugawa-era Shushi Neo-Confucianism (Chinese: *Zhu Xi* 朱熹) had held that the people would be prosperous and peaceful in so far as the rulers cultivated their own virtues. "If those ruling could cultivate themselves in this way, then they would find their families well ordered, their states well governed, and all below heaven enjoying great peace."[19]

The Meiji restoration eradicated this doctrine as an intellectual justification for absolutist rule. As an ethical system, though, Neo-Confucianism still held sway in Japanese society; indeed, the very language of ethics remained couched in Neo-Confucian terms and concepts. Most of the modernizing intellectuals such as Nishi sought to show that, since the ethics of Neo-Confucianism were inseparable from its political thought, Shushi ethics were thus obsolete. Japan needed a new intellectual ordering of morality for the new, modern society. The discourse on morality, as just noted, knew only terms that were fixed to the Confucian context. Nishi sought to shift the meaning of the key term *ri* from Confucian thought in order to provide a *mode d'entrée* for Utilitarian and positivist ethics. The key point from the standpoint of translation is that Nishi could neither simply translate "ethics" as "*ri*" nor introduce a new term that had no conceptual grounding for Japanese speakers. He thus refashioned the sense of target language meanings to accommodate that of the original language, undermining the signification of the term in the Japanese context.

The established meaning of *ri* (Ch: *li* 理) in Confucian metaphysics indicated the organizing principle of an object, as opposed to *ki* (Ch.: *qi* 氣), which denoted the vital physicality of an object. In the Shushi variant of Neo-Confucianism espoused by Tokugawa scholars, *ri* entailed a moral meaning, in that it implied what an object ought to be. This normative aspect applied to the world of human affairs, as well as the natural world. Thus, one could, for example, speak of the *ri* of good governance just as well as the *ri* of falling rain.

Nishi equated *ri* with the English "principle" but reconfigured the meaning to indicate "reason"

or "natural law." In his *Three Human Treasures* (*Jinsei Sanposetsu*), Nishi elaborated on his reasoning for this shift in meaning. Under the influence of Confucian thought, he asserted, people fail to differentiate between two types of principle, "they make not the least distinction between the principle of loyalty to one's lord and filiality to one's parents, the principle of the falling of the rain and the principle of the shining of the sun — all of these are called "principle"…because the vast majority of people think of these as one thing, a great mistake is made."[20] Imputing moral power to natural phenomena, he charged, perpetuated superstition and hindered the acquisition of true knowledge and stifled moral discourse.[21]

In his translations of "principle" Nishi differentiated between principle of the mind (*shinri* 心理) and physical principle (*butsuri* 物理), utilizing new terms that he coined. "Though we may speak of this principle and that principle as the same, *ri* in fact has two paths, and we must realize that the two are not even distinctly related. To distinguish the two, I shall call one *shinri* and the other *butsuri*."[22] Nishi built upon this neologistic foundation in order to convey additional philosophical concepts from English. "Reason" was rendered *risei* (理性), while "principle" (as in a logical tenet) was *dōri* (道理). This last neologism repurposed a Neo-Confucian term, where *dōri* (Ch.: *daoli* 道理) indicated "principle" including a moral content.[23]

Late Tokugawa scholars had already begun to criticize the unitary Confucian concept of *ri*. Ogyū Sorai, in fact, had differentiated between the laws governing heaven (*tendō* 天道) and those of self-integrity (*jiii* 自良). Nishi, having received an excellent Tokugawa education, was doubtless familiar with Ogyū 's reconstruction, although he did not comment on them in his own work. However, Ogyū's construction *dō*, meaning "way" could not have been an acceptable translation for Nishi, whose concern was not simply to dismantle the Confucian constructions, but to associate the Japanese terms to the Utilitarian English vocabulary. The bridge he sought to build had to connect back to "principle" in order to invoke the Utilitarian tenets he advocated.

Bifurcating *ri* into *butsuri* and *shinri* created two realms of principle: the natural realm of fact and the human realm of value. The former followed unalterable rules of nature; the latter are subject to human choice. "Although they are based on nature, you can defy or alter them if you wish."[24] Stripped of their traditional epistemological confusions, both realms were now subject to "truthful knowledge" via rationality and empiricism.

4. Modernizing *Jitsugaku*

The sort of truthful knowledge Nishi hoped to authorize was practical knowledge of the world, which aimed to produce useful things; in other words, precisely the sort of empirical, rational knowledge espoused by Utilitarianism. In his writings, Nishi rendered "practical knowledge" as *jitsugaku* (実学), a venerable Confucian term that indicated the study of the Way with an aim to increase the common good. The "practicality" of Confucianism contrasted with the "emptiness" of

Buddhism and the "nothingness" of Taoism.[25] This Confucian meaning had already been under attack by critics since the middle of the nineteenth century, particularly by Ogyū Sorai.[26] Nishi now definitively severed the Confucian connection by linking *jitsugaku* to an epistemology rooted in "Western" learning. His effort accompanied those of other *Meirokusha* scholars, such as Fukuzawa Yukichi, who averred,

> "Learning does not mean useless accomplishments, such as knowing strange words, or reading old and difficult texts, or enjoying and writing poetry. These accomplishments...should not be slavishly worshipped as the usual run of scholars try to persuade us....[T]his kind of unpractical knowledge should be left to other days, and one's best efforts should be given to practical learning [*jitsugaku*] that is close to everyday needs....This is the practical learning that all men, without distinction of rank, should acquire."[27]

With this transformation, Nishi completed the syllogism that had motivated him from his initial years studying in Leiden. Western technological achievements lay in an epistemology founded in empirical, practical investigation (*jitsugaku*) of natural principles (*butsuri*). At the same time, ethics (*rigaku* 理学), freed from superstitions and self-justificatory elitist pursuits, could be reformed as an ethics for modern citizens. *Rigaku* carried Utilitarian undertones, which, while promoting overall social good as the normative ends of ethics, also espoused an egalitarian society. Further, by grounding ethical decision-making in reason (accessible to any educated citizen), *rigaku* accommodated individual agency even as it prioritized the group over the individual.

5. Inoue Tetsujirō and Re-translation: from *Rigaku* to *Rinrigaku*

In the society that developed over the next several decades, Nishi's reconciliation of Utilitarianism with the post-Tokugawa social milieu failed to catch hold.[28] Nishi coined the term *rigaku* as a neologism to convey the study of ethics as Western academic philosophy; however, it is in the nature of language as a *res publica* that no term holds absolute claim to any meaning and no meaning holds absolute claim to a certain form. By the early 1880s, Nishi's formulation of *rigaku* receded in common use, as the term *rinrigaku* took hold in academic, political and journalistic contexts as a standard translation of "ethics." Importantly, the meaning of the referent shaded from Nishi's focus on individual agency (for the greater good) to an ethic of social responsibility.

The early Meiji years were a period "after the sun had set, but the moon had not yet risen" according to Nishi's fellow *Meirokusha* intellectual, Nishimura Shigeki.[29] By the 1880s, younger philosophers, avowing a nationalistic basis for morality, began employing Nishi's vocabulary toward a new end, seeking to establish the terms, issues and limits of legitimate moral discourse. The ethics

articulated by these philosophers, influenced by Social Darwinism, stressed the centrality of the state, social union, duties and self-sacrifice.[30] By far the most influential of these, Inoue Tetsujirō (1856-1944), held the first departmental chair of ethics at Tokyo University. His early treatise on ethics, the *Rinri Shinsetsu* (*A New Theory of Ethics,* 1883), altered Nishi's *rigaku* to *rinrigaku* (倫理学). In 1884, Inoue collaborated with Katō Hiroyuki (Nishi's erstwhile Meirokusha colleague, now the university president) to draft the first Japanese-language philosophical dictionary, the *Tetsugaku Jii* (*Dictionary of Philosophy*), which also rendered "ethics" as *rinrigaku.*

The additional *rin* (倫) evokes the five Confucian relationships (*wulun* 五倫) of filial piety. While not espousing Confucianism itself, the reformulation conceptually binds ethical reasoning to social duties. Indeed, although Inoue criticized Chinese learning for being too literary and historical, he was a deep scholar of Confucianism and Buddhism.[31] In contrast to Nishi, Inoue found much to be salvaged in Confucianism's concern for social cohesion, and indeed, *rinrigaku* accorded well with Inoue's broader political activities publicizing *kokutai* and "national morality." As John Maraldo notes, "[t]he prewar construction of a national ideology, as well as the establishment of academic philosophy in Japan, owe much to Inoue Tetsujirō's influence."[32]

In terms of translingual practice, the key point is that Inoue relied on Nishi's earlier work. Nishi's analysis of Neo-Confucian *ri* into physical and social (*viz.* ethical) elements created the vocabulary that authorized intellectual consideration of how a modern society might legitimate social relations on their own terms, rather than via reference to cosmological models. True, Inoue incorporated Confucian overtones to *rinrigaku*, but even here, "ethics" as an academic subject of inquiry asserted its independence from traditional "natural philosophy" approaches. In other words, Inoue continued the translingual practice of creating new language and concepts in light of foreign ideas. At this stage, as intellectuals began to internalize and naturalize terms and concepts, translingual practice entailed a competitive intra-language dimension, as Inoue's work shifted to the foreground of the Japanese intelligentsia. One way to understand the social dynamics that facilitated this re-translation is Pierre Bourdieu's theory of competitive social and cultural power.

Bourdieu sees any society as the arbitrary result of competition for power. The distribution of resources, patterns of thought, hierarchies and dynamics all continuously vie to both sustain and challenge social structures. Any element that members of society value – material resources, status, ideas, language, etc. – constitute capital. Analytically, this competition can be seen as occurring across any number of fields of struggle: political, academic, artistic and the like. Each field is a structured arena of competition organized around specific types of capital.[33] In this framework, intellectuals (especially philosophers), as "specialists in cultural production and creators of symbolic power," play an outsized role in shaping society and legitimating hierarchies.[34] Ideas, articulated and controlled by words, constitute the primary capital of intellectuals. An exhaustive Bourdieusian analysis of the Meiji intellectual field lies beyond the scope of this essay. Provisionally, though, we can identify the key

element of power that facilitated the ascent on *rinrigaku* over *rigaku*: academic professionalization.

In terms of power analysis, the founding of Tokyo Imperial University in 1877 provided potent social and cultural capital to those (such as Katō Hiroyuki and Inoue Tetsujirō) in a position to benefit from them. First, the university instituted a status hierarchy for its affiliated intellectuals and their products. Professionalization (specifically, professorships) afforded legitimation, authority and prestige to a degree not obtainable by those outside the university system. Further, it facilitated the development of symbolic power; that is, the power to impose classifications and meanings as legitimate within Meiji society. At the same time, the development of modern academic publishing provided the material (*viz.*, economic) power to propagate views such as Inoue's widely to the educated public. With the establishment of academic philosophy, the volume of both translated Western texts and original Japanese works vastly increased. Additionally, of course, the number of scholars engaging in advanced study increased dramatically. Inoue's *Dictionary* exemplifies this overall dynamic. Inoue, Kato and other academic philosophers not only achieved "preeminent status in their fields" but shaped the intellectual terrain of Japanese society.[35]

6. Conclusion: the Field of Language and Power

This exploration of how Nishi Amane translated Confucian terms in order to facilitate the introduction of Utilitarian ethics and how his terminology, in turn, gave way to yet a new formulation, alerts us to how translingual practice is historically situated in both the interaction between cultures and within a society. In so far as cultures and societies act in dynamic fields of power competition, this translingual practice is always somewhat fugitive: subject to the ebb and flow of power across cultures and through societies. This variability means that semantic links between texts can be tentative; proffered significations begin to change from the moment the translator releases the work to the public. Yet despite this variability, the effects of translingual practice are enduring. The translated work becomes a new, enduring artifact of knowledge. It can take on a life of its own, even eclipsing the original text.

This essay has considered how this transitory/enduring paradox applies not only to the texts, but to the ideas they carry and the social contexts in which they act. All of these elements - text, word, idea - can be thought of as elements of symbolic power in a Bourdieusian field, open to contestation: the tools through which agents (individuals, organizations) seek to increase their relevant capital. The most relevant capital in this case is intellectual legitimacy, through which these philosophers sought to reshape the framework of ethical knowledge in a rapidly changing society. In this framework, translingual practice deploys strategies to codify and normalize the terms of this knowledge in order to establish a particular intellectual legitimacy. The symbolic power of words governs basic assumptions and patterns of thought about the individual's relation to society and the citizen's relation to the government. The Meiji Restoration changed subjects into citizens – who became increasingly

educated and politically aware. The difference between Nishi's *rigaku* and Inoue's *rinrigaku*, although nuanced, contested for expressing what they meant when they discussed ethics for their new society.

Endnotes

[1] Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power,* translated by Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 48.

[2] Paul Ricoeur, *On Translation,* translated by Eileen Brennan (New York: Routledge, 2006), 13.

[3] Ricoeur, 36.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] The volume of ethnographic studies conveying information to the metropole is generally are small in comparison to the volume of texts that flow from the metropole to the colony. More significantly, it is doubtful that the information contained in ethnographic studies, although *about* the colonial culture is really *of* the culture. Lydia H. Liu, "Translingual Practice: the Discourse of Individualism between China and the West" in *Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia*, edited by Tani E. Barlow (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 86.

[7] Liu, 86. There is a strong case that this insight could be generalized: *all* intercultural translation involves a disparity of power.

[8] Quoted by Andre Haag, "Maruyama Masao and Kato Shuichi, *Translation and Japanese Modernity*" in *Translation in Modern Japan*, edited by Indra Levy (London: Routledge, 2011), 18.

[9] John C. Maraldo, "The Japanese Encounter with and Appropriation of Western Philosophy." In *The Oxford Companion to Japanese Philosophy,* edited by Bret W. Davis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). In his entry on modern academic philosophy in *Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook* John Maraldo, couched the encounter more diplomatically as the "introduction of Western philosophy" into Japan. John C. Maraldo "Modern Academic Philosophy." In *Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook*, edited by James W. Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis and John C. Maraldo (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011), 554. Thomas R.H. Havens, *Nishi Amane and Modern Japanese Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 86.

[10] Douglas Howland, *Personal Liberty and Public Good: The Introduction of John Stuart Mill to Japan and China*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 25. We should bear in mind, though, that the idea of translation as a concept or tool that shapes inter-cultural exchange of knowledge belongs to 20th century academia. Chinese and Japanese translators of the time certainly *did* consider their translations to be authoritative.

[11] Masahiro Hamashita, "Nishi Amane on Aesthetics: A Japanese Version of Utilitarian Aesthetics." In *Japanese Hermeneutics*, edited by Michael Marra (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), 89.

[12] Quoted in Havens, 48.

[13] Ibid. 52.

[14] Letter to Matsuoka Rinjiro, June 12, 1862. Quoted in Havens, 24. This sentiment supports Maruyama and Kato's thesis, quoted above, that Japan's disillusionment with China conditioned its radical turn toward, and embrace of, Europe and America. C.f Haag, *passim.*

[15] The lead founder of *Meirokusha*, Mori Arinori, would become Minister of Education in 1885, before his assassination by reactionaries in 1889. Fukuzawa Yukichi would become the most famous of the *Meirokusha* intellectuals, similarly advocated educational reform in his influential *Encouragement to Learning*.

[16] Havens, 87f.

[17] Havens, 223f.

[18] Havens, 46.

[19] John Tucker, "Japanese Confucian Philosophy" in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2017 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/spr2017/entries/japanese-confucian.

[20] *Hyakuichi Shinron* in *Nishi Amane Zenshu* v1 ed. Okubo Toshiaki (Tokyo: Munetaka Shobou, 1960), 276-277.

[21] Nishi considered the English "morality," typically translated as "*oshie*" (teachings") to be charged with religious meaning and thus notated his use of this translation to specifically mean the teaching of "human ways" (*jindo*). Reitan, 25.

[22] Ibid.

[23] In contemporary Japanese *dori* denotes "reason, truth, logic," while *ri* is typically translated today as "principle." That neither carry a moral component derives, it seems, from Nishi's original formulation.

[24] Quoted in Havens, 134.

[25] Ibid. 231.

[26] Minamoto Ryoen, "*Jitsugaku* and Empirical Learning in the First Half of the Tokugawa Period" in *Principle and Practicality: Essays in Neo-Confucianism and Practical Learning*, edited by William de Bary and Irene Bloom (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 375.

[27] Fukuzawa Yukichi, *An Encouragement to Learning*. Quoted in Reitan, 29.

[28] Still, much of the vocabulary Nishi developed in the course of his translations and commentaries became the common currency of Japanese academic philosophy.

[29] Quoted ibid.,126.

[30] Reitan, xiii.

[31] Howland, 51. On Inoue and Buddhism, see Dennis Hirota, "Japanese Pure Land Philosophy", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/japanese-pure-land/

[32] Maraldo, et.al., *Japanese Philosophy,* 567.

[33] David L. Swartz, *Symbolic Power, Politics and Intellectuals: The Political Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 35.

[34] David L. Swartz, *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 4.
[35] Howland, 93.

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