

Kyoto-Soochow Joint Workshop  
on  
“Virtue Epistemology : East & West”

- ・ 日時 : 2015 年 6 月 3 日 (水) 16:30~19:30
- ・ 場所 : 文学部東館 2 F KUASU 多目的室
- ・ 使用言語 : 英語

**CHIENKUO MI (Michael)**

Title : Reflective Knowledge: Knowledge Extended

Abstract

Palermos and Pritchard (2013) set out an account of extended knowledge. Crucial to the authors' account of extended knowledge is the role played by cognition. The view that they endorse is one according to which cognitive ability is necessary for knowledge, where cognitive ability is understood as producing reliable belief forming processes and is part of or has been integrated into an agent's cognitive character. The reliability component of the condition is an epistemic externalist condition regarding justification conducive to knowledge. Such a condition by itself faces counterexamples and ignores internalist intuitions. We consider but reject Pritchard's epistemological disjunctivism as providing a model for avoiding this danger. After setting out an account of reflection informed by Confucianism and dual-process theory, we make the case that reflective knowledge offers a superior alternative. We do so by showing that such knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge, while drawing on Sosa's account of meta-competence. The absence of such reflective knowledge playing the role that we outline forces one to concede that extended knowledge can only yield animal knowledge or, perhaps if one denies the category of animal knowledge, no knowledge at all.

## Wan-Chuan Fang

Title : Zhuangzi on Skill and the *Dao*

### Abstract

In my talk I shall give a report of some of the results I got in a paper of mine that was published several years ago\*. In choosing to report these results, I mean to help to show that, if my results have any merit, doing research in Chinese philosophy in the spirit which the term “analytic Asian philosophy” may entail can be very useful.

In the famous parable of Cook Ding (庖丁) in the *Zhuangzi* (《莊子》), Cook Ding himself links his wonderful skill of effortlessly dismembering an ox to the *Dao* (or the Way, 道), when, in response to the praise of his exceptional skill from Lord Wenhui, he says that “What I care about is the Way [the *Dao*], which goes beyond skill”. But what does skill get to do with the *Dao*? And in what sense does the *Dao* go beyond skill? The main purpose of my talk is to try to answer questions like these. For this purpose, I shall draw on fruitful discussions of the skill phenomena from both Gilbert Ryle and John Searle. Use will also be made of Aristotle’s conception of what we may call moral perception. With help from these various sources, the linkage in question and the way the *Dao* goes beyond skill can be shown to be making interesting and important sense. My discussion will also help to illuminate the notions of the *Dao* and *wu-wei* (effortless action, 無為).

\*方萬全, 〈莊子論技與道〉, 《中國哲學與文化》, 第六輯, 香港中文大學劉笑敢主編 (廣西師範大學出版社, 二〇〇九年), 頁 259-286。[Wan-Chuan Fang, “Zhuangzi on Skill and the *Dao*,” *Chinese Philosophy and Culture*, Vol. 6, ed., Xiao-Gan Liu (Chinese University of Hong Kong), (Guangxi, China: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2009), pp. 259-286.]

**Shane Ryan**

Title : Skilful Reflection as an Epistemic Virtue

Abstract

We argue that skilful reflection makes a positive contribution to the epistemic status of beliefs and agents. In doing so we defend and develop previous research in which we argued that skilful reflection is an epistemic virtue. This paper starts out by making the case that reflection occupies a place of significance in both the work of Ernest Sosa and Linda Zagzebski, two leading virtue epistemologists. Nonetheless, despite the significance of reflection for both theorists, problems emerge for their views if we understand reflection in a way that maybe quite intuitive. Drawing on a Confucius conception of the reflection of a virtuous agent, we set out an alternative account of reflection. On the account we provide, type 1 and type 2 processes, processes described in dual process theory, both play a role in reflection. We then show how this account of reflection avoids the problems previously mentioned and redeems the view of reflection, albeit skilful reflection, as making a contribution to the epistemic status of beliefs and our intellectual agency.

**Hsiang-min Shen**

Title : On Intellectual Virtue, Moral Virtue, Knowledge and their Relationship: A View from Zhu Xi's Philosophy

Abstract

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