

WORKING PAPER: 'On Mutual Influence between European philosophy and Asian philosophy in the Early 20th Century'

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1. Overview

The aim of this research project 'On mutual influence between European philosophy and Asian philosophy in the early 20th century' is to investigate philosophical interaction between Eastern and Western philosophy/thought in the early 20th century, focusing on the following two topics: (i) K. C. Bhattacharyya's critique of Kant's notion of subject and his idea of the subject as knowable but unthinkable; (ii) a comparison between Martin Heidegger's notion of Nothingness and Nishida Kitaro's absolute nothingness. The research on (i) is conducted mainly by Iizuka. The research on (ii) is conducted mainly by Fujikawa, with Filippo Casati (University of St. Andrews). The results of these researches are published as the following two articles:

- [1] Iizuka, H. (2014). 'K. C. Bhattacharyya's Concept of the Subject as Knowable without Thinking', in Asato, W. Fujikawa, N. and Yoshino, Y. (eds). *The 6th Next-Generation Global Workshop "Revisiting the Intimate and Public Spheres and the East-West Encounter"* Postceedings
- [2] Casati, F. and Fujikawa, N. (2014). 'Heidegger's Nothingness and Nishida's Absolute Nothingness', in Asato, W. Fujikawa, N. and Yoshino, Y. (eds). *The 6th Next-Generation Global Workshop "Revisiting the Intimate and Public Spheres and the East-West Encounter"* Postceedings

In what follows, we summarize these researches. Section 2 is based on [1]. Section 3 is based on [2].

2. K. C. Bhattacharyya's Concept of the Subject as Knowable without Thinking

2.1. Introduction

In the Early Modern period, Easterners encountered Western ideas and accepted many of them. At the same time, however, in the process of this westernization, there was also tendency to connect their original thoughts with western philosophy. For Indian philosophers, it was very clear what should be considered to be as their original thoughts: Hinduism, especially, Advaita-Vedanta. In the

19th century, there was a kind of culture revival movement, which was called Neo-Vedantism, occurred and one of its goals was to reform Advaita-Vedanta in a western manner. Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya (1875-1949) is “one of the most important and influential academic representatives of the subject of philosophy in India [that is, this reformation of Advaita-Vedanta]”¹.

As Mehta said², Bhattacharyya’s philosophy is a reformation of Vedanta. In order to embed Vedanta into Western philosophy, he shows Vedanta’s similarity with Western philosophy by comparing it with many philosophers : Hegel, Schopenhauer, Plato, Spenser, etc.. However, his attention is mainly directed to Kant’s transcendental philosophy. His philosophy is not only Vedantism, but also a kind of Kantianism.

I will introduce his unique notion of the ‘subject as knowable but unthinkable’, by comparing him with Kant. By discussing his philosophy from a Kantian viewpoint, I will present his originality and his interesting objection to Kant. In order to compare them, we will focus on the ‘knowability’ in each of their philosophies.

2.2. Knowability.

2.2.1. Kant and things-in-themselves

As is well known, Kant distinguishes appearance as the object of a possible experience from what are considered to be things-in-themselves. For him, “objects must depend on our knowledge”³, and our knowledge of objects is conditioned by our subjective forms: i.e. the form of intuition (time and space) and the form of judgment (categories). Thus, “the conditions of possibility of experience [or empirical knowledge] in general are, at the same time conditions of possibility of objects of experience”⁴. Thus, an object is a thing for us or what appears for us.

We cannot know anything independent of the subject, which can be called a thing-in-itself. Especially, what cannot be given in intuition (or what cannot satisfy the condition of intuition) is the unknowable: e.g. we cannot know the judgment that ‘the soul is immortal’ to be either true or false, because ‘soul’ cannot be given in intuition.

Though we aspire to know objects beyond the human limit, especially, God, the universe, and the self itself (or soul), we cannot know them. However, they are thinkable, because non-logically inconsistent things are thinkable: “to think of an object and to know an object are... not the same”⁵. Therefore, the objects are unknowable, but thinkable and only Ideas of Reason, which are dealt with in dogmatic metaphysics.

2.2.2. Bhattacharyya and Knowledge.

1 Halbfass(1988), p.295.

2 cf. Mehta, J. L.(1974)

3 Kant (1787). *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*(KdrV), Bxvi.

4 KdrV, A158/B197.

5 KdrV, B147.

For Bhattacharyya, knowledge is reduced to belief and distinction. Knowledge of X is a belief in X with my consciousness of the belief's being distinct from X. For example, it can be said that I know Ginkaku Temple, if I believe that belief in it is distinct from itself. Moreover, according to Bhattacharyya's philosophy, the belief that Ginkaku Temple is something more than mere belief in it implies that Ginkaku Temple exists objectively.

This definition is very strange. Ordinarily in philosophy, knowledge involves justification and truth. When I know Ginkaku Temple, the belief that Ginkaku Temple exists must be justified and true. However, for Bhattacharya, existence or objectivity depends on the subject. X cannot be an object, unless the subject believes in the distinctness of X. An object is what is known by or distinct from the subject.

Bhattacharyya calls the ordinary view the 'objective attitude' and his view the 'subjective attitude'⁶. In the objective attitude, the object is taken to exist beyond its known-ness to the subject: e.g, we think that the Moon exists regardless of any subject. On the contrary, in the subjective attitude, the transcendent this is "rejected as meaningless"⁷. The judgement 'the object exists' or 'the object is' is a tautology⁸, because the object is what is distinct and existence is distinctness. That the Moon exists only means that I believe in 'belief in the Moon \neq the Moon': we can speak of the Moon, as long as we have a belief or disbelief in the Moon. An object is what is known by us and an object independent of us is meaningless.

On this point, his subjective attitude is similar to Kant's critical philosophy. Together with Kant, Bhattacharyya asserts that objects depend on the subject: without being known by the subject, nothing is objective. However, for Bhattacharyya, Kant is still employing the objective attitude.

2.3. difference between Kant and Bhattacharyya

2.3.1. Metaphysics.

Against Kant, Bhattacharyya claims the possibility of metaphysical reality or knowledge of things-in-themselves: at least, we cannot deny the metaphysical reality of things-in-themselves, which is given neither in intuition nor in perception but in thought and belief.

According to Kant, we cannot know things-in-themselves. So the metaphysical reality (the reality of things-in-themselves), e.g. the reality of moral postulate, is only thought and to be believed. However, for Bhattacharyya, the situation is reversed: It is true that such a reality is not known, but it cannot be unknowable. For the unknowable is unbelievable and thus meaningless. Then, if the thing-in-itself or Idea of Reason is to be believed, it must be knowable as unknown⁹: "belief in the

⁶ *The Subject as Freedom* (SaF), §19.

⁷ *ibid.*

⁸ cf. 'The Concept of Philosophy'(CoP), §7.

⁹ SaF, §47.

unknowability of reality is not only not demanded; it is impossible.....”¹⁰.

According to Bhattacharyya, Kant’s realistic or objective attitude is the reason why he considers things-in-themselves as unknowable. In the pure subjective attitude, even things-in-themselves depend on the subject. When Bhattacharyya tries to “go much further than Kant” and to “tone down his agnosticism”¹¹, he aims in the direction of exterminating even the leavings of realism in Kantian philosophy: “there should be a subjective discipline to get rid of the persisting realistic belief. Kant does not admit such a discipline at least for the theoretic reason”¹². This discipline is spiritual psychology, where he claims his unique idea.

2.3.2. Spiritual psychology

Both Kant and Bhattacharyya claim that the subject is not the object or objective, though the reason is different. For Kant, the subject is not objective, because it is not given in intuition but what is considered as a thing-in-itself: so the subject is dealt with in metaphysics. For Bhattacharyya, the subject is not objective, because it is not meanable or thinkable: and there is no metaphysics of it. According to Bhattacharyya, thinking is thinking ‘of’ something and then the thinkable is objective. This difference is due to the extension of objects. In sum,

- 1) For Kant, the thinkable is either objective (knowable) or non-objective (unknowable).
- 2) For Bhattacharyya, the thinkable is objective and knowable: and the knowable is either objective or non-objective.

For Bhattacharyya, the subject is knowable and non-objective (then, unthinkable). If so, there must be a study of the subject beyond metaphysics and science: For the subject is neither thinkable nor perceivable and, then, the knowledge is dealt with neither in metaphysics nor in natural science. The study of the subject is what he calls spiritual psychology.

Spiritual psychology is a discipline of subjective functions: e. g, knowing, feeling, willing, etc. What is the function? It is the speaking act or ‘relating act’. The subjective functions—knowing, willing, feeling, etc.—are the relating acts or modes of the speaking act: “in speaking of its function it [the subject] believes in it [the speaking act] neither as meant nor as unmeant but as being constructed as fact by being spoken¹³”. This act and the modes of it are not objective, because the act considered as object would be merely the past image of action.

It is likely that, for Bhattacharyya, the notion of the functions as thus considered is inspired by Kant’s transcendental philosophy. According to Bhattacharyya, epistemology deals with “knowing from which all that is known or objective is distinct”¹⁴ and it is exemplified by “Kant’s

10 SaF, §48., cf. §49.

11 CoP, §4.

12 SaF, §21.

13 SaF, §15.

14 SaF, §12.

transcendental method”¹⁵. ‘The transcendental’ is taken as “the self as conscious act or freedom” and it is not “quiescent consciousness or undifferented being like the Vedantist”¹⁶. Or “the self is to him [Kant] an active consciousness or conscious act, whether as knowing or as willing”¹⁷. Thus, for example, it is said that Kant considers the reality of the willing function as “apprehended in the willing consciousness only”¹⁸.

For Kant, what are called functions by Bhattacharyya, i.e, thinking, knowing, willing etc., are spontaneous activities¹⁹, which are not limited by natural causality, because the subject does not belong to the phenomenal world. Likewise, for Bhattacharyya, the subject can freely or arbitrarily relate to the objects: “the knowing function represents a positive mode of this freedom, the freedom of the subject to relate to the object without getting related to it”²⁰. So, just in this sense, Kant’s philosophy is taken as a disguised form of spiritual psychology.

However, for Bhattacharyya, Kant’s subjective (or transcendental) attitude is not thorough, so that he still persists in the objective attitude. Kant’s main concern is not knowing itself, but “knowing of object”²¹: “Its [his philosophy’s] interest is still in the object, in the knownness or objectivity of the object which it seeks to understand theoretically as knowing”²². His concern is limited to objects, which are either knowable or unknowable: i. e, empirical object or thing-in-itself. Then, Kant was not interested in function itself, which is not objective but purely subjective.

However, in speaking of the functions, Kant must believe in them, though they are neither empirical object nor thing-in-itself. The fact that we can believe in them suggests the possibility of knowledge of them: For the unknowable is unbelievable, though they are still unknown:

The facthood of the knowing function and subjective function in general is believed though not known and is elaborated into a system of symbolisms in a new philosophical study which may be called Spiritual or Transcendental Psychology²³.

Thus, for Bhattacharyya, the subjective functions are knowable, though not thinkable (objective). We have the study of the functions, i.e, Spiritual psychology and through the functions, we can aim at the subject itself.

2.4. Summary of Section 2

15 ‘Knowledge and Truth’, Analysis.

16 ‘Studies in Kant’, §1.

17 *ibid.*

18 SaF, §20.

19 cf. KdrV, A50/B74.etc.

20 cf. SaF, §13.

21 SaF, §20.

22 *ibid.*

23 SaF, §16.

The difference between Kant and Bhattacharyya is never just the definition of terms. According to Bhattacharyya, the main problem in Kant's philosophy is that it is neither transcendental, subjective, nor spiritual enough and that, for this reason, Kant admits no self-knowledge, which is the essence of Vedanta. For Kant, the subject is absolutely unknowable. But, in refraining from the objective attitude, i.e. in rejecting things-in-themselves and admitting the functions, which cannot be objective or thinkable, the self itself ceases to be a mere idea in the Kantian sense.

Thus the self is knowable, that is, we cannot deny the possibility of knowledge of the subject. The concrete process to realize the self, the possibility of which is here merely not denied, is presented in *The Subject as Freedom*. However, because of limited space, I cannot cover this in detail.

3. Heidegger's Nothingness and Nishida's Absolute Nothingness

3.1. Introduction

In this section, we compare Heidegger's notion of Nothingness and Nishida's notion of absolute nothingness and show that they share essential features. We claim that Heidegger after the *Kehre* (the turning point of his philosophy, which is supposed to happen at the mid-1930s) and Nishida admits that nothingness, the fundamental reality which grounds everything, is contradictory by its nature: it is not an object but is object; it is ineffable---one can not say anything about it---but is effable.

3.2 Heidegger's Nothingness

Let us begin with confirming Heidegger's basic claims about Nothingness. First, equating Nothingness with Being (*Sein*), Heidegger claims that Nothingness is what makes an object an object, that is, the ground of everything (Heidegger, 1996, p.23). Secondly, Heidegger claims that Nothingness is not an object. According to Heidegger, Nothingness as what is equated with Being is *nihil absolutum*, not *nihil relativum*. In this sense, "nothingness [*nihil absolutum* or, in ancient greek, *me on*] does not mean a specific negation of a single entity but the unconditional negation of everything that is" (Heidegger, 1991, p. 178). The *nihil absolutum* is the negation of the world (*welt*) in itself, where the world should be interpreted as the totality of all the objects. Briefly, Nothingness considered as *nihil absolutum* is not an object at all since, according to Heidegger, the negation of the totality of objects is not an object itself. This concept that, in Heidegger, draws a distinction between *nihil absolutum* and entities, is called *ontological difference*.

An interesting philosophical consequence of this ontological assumptions about Nothingness is the impossibility of speaking about Nothingness---Heidegger's Nothingness is *ineffable* (cf. Priest, 2002). This impossibility is due to the Heideggerian characterization of objecthood on the basis of intentionality. According to Heidegger, everything that is grasping with an intentional act is an object: everything we can refer to (think about etc. etc) is what it is called object. Since, according to the *ontological difference*, Nothingness is not an object, Heidegger concludes that we cannot think nor speak about Nothingness.

However, this directly contradicts the apparent effability of Nothingness. According to the ineffability of Nothingness, Nothingness is thought as the unthinkable or the unnameable. And, of course, to claim that Nothingness is unnameable means that we are already naming it. In exactly the same way, to think that Nothingness is unthinkable means that we are already thinking about it. Nothingness is thus not only ineffable but also effable. Let us call this problem *the ineffability problem* of Nothingness. An immediate consequence of this effability of Nothingness is that it is an object, given Heidegger's definition of objects as what one can think about. This leads to a different contradiction, since, as we have seen, Nothingness is not an object. This issue that Heidegger faces in defining Nothingness is clearly presented in 'What Is Metaphysics?': "what is Nothing? Our very first approach to this question has something unusual about it. In our asking, we posit the nothing in advance as something that is such and such; we posit it as a being" (Heidegger, 1977b, p. 98). Indeed, this contradiction is the most controversial aspect of the so-called "aporia of Nothingness" in Heidegger's philosophy. The question about Nothingness forces Heidegger to face a rigorous *aut aut*, where he has two options: retaining a logical system that rejects antinomies relying on the principle of non-contradiction (**LNC**) or advocating a metaphysics that leads to accept contradictory objects.

The solution proposed by the so-called "second Heidegger" (the Heidegger after the *Kehre*) seems to accept the second option. The second Heidegger seems to admit that it is necessary to state a contradiction in order to talk about Nothingness. In particular, in *Contribution to Philosophy*, Heidegger supports the idea that, facing the *aut aut* previously presented, it is necessary to abandon **LNC** in favor of a metaphysics of contradictory objects. **LNC**, primarily assumed by formal logic and mathematics, should not be considered as the aristotelian *bebaiotate arche'* (the *principium firmissimum*) anymore because:

symbolic mathematics is itself only one possible kind of mathematics applied to propositions and propositional forms. All mathematical logics and symbolic logics must fasten on Logos [on **LNC**]. Symbolic logic and scientific logic with the law of non-contradiction collapse as soon as it becomes clear how limited they are. (1957, p.15)

The limits of **LNC** are represented exactly by Nothingness because Nothingness is “a-logical (*A-logik*)” (2007, p.102). It is something “beyond numbers, beyond logical principles (*Grundsatz*)” (2007, p.102). Here, it is interesting to underline that “*Grundsatz*” is also the expression used by Heidegger when he refers to what he thinks as “basic principle of logic” (for example, the principle of (non)contradiction, the law of excluded middle etc. etc.). Even more clearly, Heidegger states that: “Nothingness is a contradiction” (2007, p.13). He thinks that, about the question of Nothingness (about the *Ur-frage*), the only solution is to accept the idea that Nothingness itself represents an antinomy. Heidegger says:

The *Da-Sein* [the human being] should not only think about *Being* [= Nothingness] and objects as two opposite sides of a river but he should also think about *Being* [= Nothingness] as an object at the same time (2007, p.43).

This is the tremendous, terrific truth contained in *Contribution to philosophy*, namely the human being (the *Da-Sein*) thinking about the ontological question of Nothingness. Indeed, the human being, asking and answering the question of Nothingness, is forced (in aristotelian ancient greek language, *kata to kreo* ---“by necessity”) to think to a (or even “*the*”) contradiction. The original sin or mistake was to try to escape from the *aporia*, from the contradiction while Nothingness is exactly that contradiction, that *aporia*. Nothingness is a *dialetheia*.

In sum, we confirmed the following points: Nothingness is the fundamental reality which grounds every objects. Such ground is ineffable and not an object at all. However, Nothingness is apparently effable---we can think about it and say something about it---, and given Heidegger’s notion of object as intentional object, this entails that Nothingness is an object. Finally, at least after the *Kehre*, Heidegger seems to admit this contradictory nature of Nothingness.

3.3. Nishida on Absolute Nothingness

As is stated in the introduction, the aim of this part is to show that Heidegger's notion of Nothingness and Nishida's notion of absolute nothingness share essential features. For this purpose, in this section, we review Nishida Kitaro's notion of *absolute nothingness* in Nishida (1926a, 1926b). We will see the following points: (i) absolute nothingness, what makes every object be, itself is not an object and is ineffable by its nature; (ii) however, absolute nothingness is apparently effable---this leads to the ineffability problem---and thus an object; and (iii) Nishida tried to solve this problem by appealing to a self-reflectivity of absolute nothingness---absolute nothingness is like a self-reflective mirror which reflects itself within itself.

First, we confirm that absolute nothingness is not an object. Since Nishida defines his notion of objects and absolute nothingness in terms of his "logic of place", let us begin with reviewing it.

According to Nishida, a relation among objects holds only in a place: if a and b are objects and they stand in a relation R , they must do so in some place p . In particular, objects which relate to each other must *be within* a place. An obvious model of this understanding of relations on the basis of places is relations among physical objects. Physical objects relate to each other only in a physical space wherein they are. However, his notion of places and objects within them more general and abstract. According to Nishida, these notions can be seen in a subsumptive judgment of the form A is B , where the subject A is subsumed by the predicate B . Nishida claims that a subject of such a judgment corresponds to an object; its predicate corresponds to a place within which the object is; and the subsumptive relation between a subject and a predicate corresponds to the *being-within* relation between an object and a place. Note that Nishida uses several different terms to refer to the *being-within* relation. "Reflect" is among them. In this terminology, a place reflects an object within which it is. In this sense, a place is a *mirror*.²⁴

For Nishida, it is crucial to distinguish the *being-within* relation between an object and a place from a relation between two objects. In particular, the *being-within* relation is not a relation between two objects. According to Nishida, the second relatum of the relation, that is, a place, is not an object. If a place is not an object, what is it? Nishida's answer is that it is *nothingness*. In what follows, we will see this answer more precisely.

On this understanding of the notion of place, Nishida claims that *to be an object is to be within a place*. This definition entails that the notions of being an object and being a place are basically

²⁴ Nishida also use the term "envelope" to refer to the *being-within* relation. In this terminology, a place envelopes an object within which it is.

relative ones: something is an object only with respect to some place, and a place which reflects some objects can be an object with respect to some other place which reflects the place. Nishida calls nothingness which can be an object with respect to some place *relative nothingness*. However, if there is a place such that there is no place within which it is, such a place can never be an object. This is exactly what Nishida calls *absolute nothingness*.

Exactly the same point can be illustrated by his another characterization of absolute nothingness. According to Nishida, absolute nothingness is the *transcendent predicate*, the predicate which can never be the subject of any subsumptive judgment.²⁵ As we have seen, the subject of a subsumptive judgment corresponds to an object which is within a place corresponding its predicate. Since the transcendent predicate can never be a subject of any subsumptive judgment, absolute nothingness can never be an object.

So far we have confirmed that absolute nothingness is not an object. In addition to this, Nishida claims that absolute nothingness is a place within which everything is (cf. *Nishida Kitaro Zenshu*, VII, p. 224). Given that to be an object is to be within a place, this means absolute nothingness is what makes everything be. Absolute nothingness is, like Heidegger's Nothingness, the fundamental reality which grounds all objects.

As we have seen, absolute nothingness can never be the subject of any judgment. This immediately leads to *the ineffability of absolute nothingness*. Something is ineffable if one cannot make any judgment about it, any judgment which attributes some characteristic to it. In a judgment, what attributes a characteristic is its predicate and what is attributed a characteristic is its subject. Thus, something is ineffable if it refuses any predication. Absolute nothingness is ineffable in this sense. This is a straightforward consequence of his exposition of absolute nothingness as the transcendent predicate, the predicate which can never become the subject of any subsumptive judgment. There is no judgment whose subject denotes absolute nothingness, and thus, there is no judgment about it.

However, it is so easy to see that absolute nothingness is effable as well. Indeed the previous paragraphs contain many judgments about it such as that absolute nothingness is the transcendent predicate. This contradicts the exposition of absolute nothingness as the transcendent predicate---the ineffability problem arises. Moreover, this immediately leads to a metaphysical perplexity. For

²⁵ As Nishida explicitly mentioned, this is the inversion of Aristotelian notion of first substance. Aristotle defines a first substance as something which is the subject of a subsumptive judgment but never can be the predicate of any subsumptive judgment.

Nishida, to be an object is to be within a place and to be within a place is to be a subject of a subsumptive judgment. If there is a subsumptive judgment whose subject is absolute nothingness, absolute nothingness *is* an object. The antecedent apparently holds, as we have seen. It follows that absolute nothingness *is* an object. However, according to Nishida, absolute nothingness is not an object. We have to conclude that absolute nothingness is an object and not an object.

Does Nishida admit this alleged contradictory nature of absolute nothingness? Even though he introduces absolute nothingness and equate it with consciousness (that is conscious)²⁶ to explain how we can apprehend absolute nothingness/consciousness without *objectifying it*, we think his answer is *yes*. This is because of Nishida's well-known claim that absolute nothingness is *a mirror which reflects itself within itself*. Indeed, for Nishida, this self-reflexivity or *self-awareness* is the basic structure of consciousness/absolute nothingness. As we have seen, in Nishida's terminology, '*a* reflects *b*' and '*b* is within *a*' means the same thing. If absolute nothingness is reflected within itself, this means that it is an object with respect to itself, given Nishida's definition of being an object. The absolute nothingness as the known is thus an object. On the other hand, it is still the case that the absolute nothingness is not an object, given his definition of it. Nishida's characterization of absolute nothingness as a self-reflecting mirror thus shows the contradictory nature of absolute nothingness.

3.4. Summary of Section 3

Heidegger's Nothingness is contradictory by its nature. Nishida's absolute nothingness is too. According to Heidegger (after the *Kehre*) and Nishida, Nothingness/absolute nothingness, the fundamental reality which grounds all objects, is, on the one hand, not an object and ineffable, but on the other hand, an object and effable. Heidegger, after the *Kehre*, tends to admit this contradictory nature of Nothingness. Nishida's theory of self-awareness underlies the contradictory nature of absolute nothingness as well.

4. Conclusion

In early 20th century, some philosophers in eastern countries who encountered western philosophy tried to go beyond the limit of western philosophy by combining philosophical ideas in their own traditions with western ones. As we have seen, Bhattacharyya tried to overcome some difficulty of

²⁶ "When the universal serves as a place within which all beings are, it becomes consciousness" (*Nishida Kitaro Zenshu*, III, p. 434, English translation, p. 66. This is our translation.)

Kantian philosophy by using philosophical ideas of Indian tradition, in particular, ideas of Vedanta. It is also well-known that Nishida appealed to the notion of nothingness (in Zen tradition) to solve a perplexity in western epistemology, in particular, the neo-Kantian epistemology. In addition to this, we have confirmed a strong conceptual similarity between Nishida's notion of absolute nothingness and Heidegger's notion of Nothingness (after the *Kehre*). It is worth noting that this similarity may not be just a coincidence. Even though there is no textual evidence which shows that Heidegger was directly influenced by Nishida's notion of absolute nothingness, there is a research which shows that Heidegger was highly influenced by eastern thoughts, in particular, Chinese Daoism and Japanese Zen by comparing the German translations of texts of Daoism and Zen, which Heidegger was supposed to be familiar with, and Heidegger's own texts (May, R. 1996, *Heidegger's Hidden Sources: East Asian Influences on His Work*, London: Routledge). It is sometimes claimed that western thoughts and eastern thoughts are completely heterogeneous, but this is not true. We can find a kind of happy marriage of western and eastern thoughts in early 20th century.

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