SESSION 3 : Gender and Sexuality

Revisiting Gendered Division of Household Labor: Effects of Co-residence with Parents on Housework

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1. ABSTRACT

Since previous literature emphasized on analyzing division of household labor between married couples (including cohabiting couples) in conjugal families, this study expands research framework to include other co-resident family members. Using data conducted in the second phase, sixth wave of the research project “Taiwan Social Change Survey(TSCS)” (2011-2012) , this study estimates : 1)the main effect of co-resident parents on couples' division of household tasks; 2) the moderation effect of parental economic resources on the main effect. Findings suggest that couples living with husbands' parents tend to have a gendered division of female-typed housework, which women do cooking, washing and cleaning more often than their husbands. Results also indicate authoritative influence that daily economic resources and event-based resources have are different. These two types of economic resources provide different moderation effects in the research model.

2. INTRODUCTION

Previous studies showed that married couples are "doing gender" on division of household labor (West and Zimmerman 1987). "Doing gender" means actors not only act according to gender roles, but also produce gender order through their actions. Generally, women usually do more housework than men. When regarding contents of household tasks, i.e. female-typed tasks or male-typed tasks separately, perspectives of doing gender still dominate (Chang and Li 2007). For instance, washing is mainly women's work, while repairing is men's work.

Studies of division of household labor are mainly between husbands and wives, which are usually emphasized on western family structures. The most commonly mentioned family structure in western literature is conjugal family. Conjugal households are composed of married couples, including cohabiting couples, or their children. There are other family structures, such as multi-generation families, which consists of other family members or married couples living in the same house. Co-resident family members in other family structures may also influence the division of household labor between couples. When expanding the framework to other co-resident family members, this study aims to reveal the complexity that family structures work on focal couples than past studies. Focal couples in this study refer to couples whose division of housework was surveyed in research data.

This study argues that the division of household labor between couples is actually embedded in the complex family structures while considering other co-resident family members simultaneously. Combining with the moderation effect of financial resources, the purpose of this study is to examine the effect of co-resident family members, i.e. parents, on division of household labor between focal couples. I analyzed survey data from the second wave, sixth wave of Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) to address previous questions. Results of this study supported gender perspective arguments. In most households, unequal gendered division of household labor remains. Living with husbands' parents with moderation effects that relative parental economic resources provide, tends to enhance the gendered division of female-typed tasks between focal couples. Findings suggest that it is necessary to broaden research framework to include other family structures to do housework studies.

3. BACKGROUND

3-1. Gender Division of Household Labor

Women are the ones who do most of household tasks in many families. In Arlie Russell Hochschild ([1989] 2012) famous book, *The second shift*, she pointed out that many women in dual-income households are responsible for most of housework and child care. Similarly, Berk (1985) used a metaphor "factory" to illustrate households as socialization sites to produce and reproduce gender order. Division of housework, being one of the instances of producing gender order, was an important example of doing gender in her view. Moreover, Breen and Cooke (2005) proposed the concept of "gendered division of domestic labor", to emphasize the unequal gender division of household tasks in the private sphere.

In order to investigate the gendered division of household labor, two kinds of household labors were differentiated (see Schneider 2012). One are female-typed tasks, which are more routine and time-costing, such as cooking, cleaning, washing, and shopping, etc. These tasks are usually done by women. The others are male-typed tasks, which are more case-specific and less time-demanding, for example, repairing. These tasks tend to be done by men. This classification reveals that the gendered division of domestic labor is also relevant with contents of housework.

In addition to analyze contents of household tasks, previous studies also investigated how the gendered division of domestic labor were influenced by personal factors, such as ages, educational levels, earnings, and attitudes toward division of household. However, some studies further indicated that institutional factors also associated with the patterns of domestic tasks. For example, Hook (2010) pointed out that work conditions, such as work hours, and public welfare policies, i.e. parental leave and public child care, may influence gender segregation of household tasks between couples.

3-2. Exchange and Bargaining Models

From sociological exchange perspectives, Blau ([1964] 1992) regarded social exchange was the intermediate form between pure economic exchange and emotion expression. He pointed out the major difference between economic exchange and social exchange is the component of unspecified obligation. Through the mediation of social relations, personal feelings and an obligation of paying back occur. Using analysis of anthropology materials, Blau viewed sending gifts and providing important services are modes to attain higher status for the gift givers and service providers. Since receivers of social interactions cannot give equally reward back, they can only give respect and obedience as return. Thus, there raises an imbalanced power relation, which makes givers occupy powerful position, and receivers get subordinate position. Emerson (1962) also described imbalanced social relations as power dependence. But Emerson pointed out that social exchange cannot limit to dyad relation, but should expand to networks that members are more than two. Cook and Emerson (1978) designed an experiment to examine the effect of position in the network on power use. Their results indicated that even participants weren't aware of the positions they were in the network, positions they occupy influence the way they use power.

In household labor studies, researchers also brought in exchange and bargaining perspectives (Bittman, England, Sayer, Folbre, and Matheson 2003; Brines 1993; Coltrane 2000; Cooke 2006). These researchers viewed earnings as valuable resources for couples to argue for a desirable division of housework. Brines (1993) and Bittman et al. (2003) all pointed out that gender ideology accompanies bargaining dynamics. Bittman et al. (2003) revealed that the predicted pattern of women's housework hours by women's salary is roughly U-shaped. Low-salary women do more housework. When wives' salary increased, their housework hours decrease. When women's earnings exceed men's earnings, it threads men's gender norm as breadwinners; therefore, women will do more housework.

3-3. Hypothesis

This study considers the effect of co-resident family members, taking parents as example. When examining the main effect of co-resident parents on focal couples' division of household labor, this study also regards economic resources that social exchange perspectives mention, as moderators of the main effect.

This study raises two hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1 -- When couples co-resident with parents, since roles of patriarchic authorities presence, paternal pressure will enhance the gendered division of household tasks. This makes wives do more feminine housework and husbands do more masculine housework.

Hypothesis 2 -- Financial resources parents possess moderate the parental co-resident effect on focus couples. The greater financial resources parents hold, the greater authoritative role they are; hence, will enhance the gendered division of household labor.

4. DATA AND METHODS

4-1. Data

The study data is from the second phase, sixth wave (2011-2012) of the Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) which is a national survey of adults conducted by the Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, in Taiwan (n=2135). TSCS used stratified three-stage probability proportional to size sampling (stratified three-stage PPS sampling). Adjusting for the non-response rate, TSCS also employed inflation sample design while sampling. Due to the stratified three-stage PPS sampling and inflation sample design, this may cause the problem of unequal selection probabilities. TSCS applied survey design weights to modify this problem.

The study sample contains respondents whose own parents or spouses' parents are alive (n=901). These are all married, including cohabiting respondents, who do or do not live with their own parents or their spouses' parents.

4-2. Measures

Dependent variables -- This study used the relative ratio of housework as dependent variables to measure the gendered division of labor between couples. I calculated relative scores on female-typed tasks and male-typed tasks separately. In TSCS questionnaires, respondents were asked about the frequency of doing four kinds of household tasks in a year by themselves and by their spouses. Respondents used a 7-item scale to rate their domestic labor. These four household items are cooking dinner, washing cloth, cleaning and repairing. I classified cooking dinner, washing cloth, cleaning as female-typed tasks, and repairing as male-typed tasks. I add sum scores of respondents' and their spouses' individual scores on female-typed and male-typed tasks. Then I calculate the relative ratio each couple has on female-typed and male-typed tasks to show each couples' division of labor on particular typed tasks. Since the ranges between the maximal and the minimal ratio scores are large, these two variables are both log-transformed. Larger scores indicate more gendered division of labor.

Taking division of female-typed tasks as example, larger scores imply that it is women who do feminine housework more frequently than their husbands on female-typed tasks. When scores are close to 0, it means a relative equal division of housework. Whiles scores are smaller than 0, it means an atypical gendered division of labor occurs, which the other sex, such as men, do feminine tasks more frequently than their spouses. Equations of these two dependent variables are listed below.

Division of labor on female-typed housework

= log[(wives' sum frequency on feminine housework)/ (husbands' sum frequency on feminine housework)].

Division of labor on male-typed housework

= log[(husbands' frequency on masculine housework) / (wives' frequency on masculine housework)]

Independent variables -- In order to capture different culture meanings of living with paternal or maternal parents, I used two binary variables. One is co-resident with husbands' parents. The other is co-resident with wives' parents. In these two variables, 1 means living with parents, 0 means not living with parents.

I used two groups of variables to measure economic resources parents possess. Each group has a variable for husbands' parents, and another variable for wives' parents. First group is relative daily financial support. In TSCS, respondents were asked to use 5-item scale to rate the frequency of the daily economic support their parents (including spouses' parents) give them or they give their parents. Using the similar equation as dependent variables, I created a ratio index to measure the relative economic resources parents have than focal couples. Relative daily financial support = log[(parents' frequency on providing money to subjects)/ (subjects' frequency on providing money to parents)]. Due to the same reason as dependent variables, relative daily financial support variables are under log transformation. Positive scores on relative daily financial support imply higher bargaining power parents have on focal couples. Negative scores, on the contrary, suggest that focal couples have more economic bargaining resources than their parents.

Relative daily financial support represents persistent and usually less amount of money. There is another economic resources which indicate event-based, short-period, often large amount of money. For example, parents may give financial assistance to adult children to buy a house, pay rent, or run a business. Parents can also give houses or lands to their adult children. This kind of financial support is quite different from daily financial support, and may generate different effects on parent-adult-children relations. Therefore, I used event-based financial support as another group of financial support variables. 1 means focal couples receiving their parents' (or spouses' parents') event-based financial support since they got married. 0 means couples didn't get any event-based financial support.

Control variables. -- In previous studies, there were several important factors about division of housework. I included those factors as controls in this study. First, I used subjects' formal educational years to measure education attainment. Second, since work status may affect the time availability of couples to do housework, I included subjects' current work status as controls. Respondents can work full-time, part-time, run for family business, as housewife or househusband, currently no job or retired. Third, demographic attributes are also relevant. I included age and gender as controls. Age is included as continuous variable. Gender is binary variable, which 1 means female and 0 means male. Chang and Li (2007) indicated that father's ethnicity and mothers' education attainment are important variables to division of household labor between Taiwanese couples. Thus, I included subjects' father's ethnicity and mother's education attainment as controls in this study.

Categories of father's ethnicity are Minnan, Hakka, Mainland, Native, foreigners. In regression models, I used a binary variable, Minnan, to refer to father's ethnicity (Minnan=1). Minnan indicates those Taiwanese who ancestors came from south-western coast of China before Chinese civil war. Mother's education attainment is a continuous variable which measured by formal educational years. Respondents whose fathers' ethnicity as Minnan and have low mother's formal education years tend to have a more traditional division of household labor. Last but not least, Gender equality attitudes may also influence the division of housework. TSCS used a 5-item scale to let respondents' rate their gender role attitudes. This scale was composed of four statements. I used the sum score of this scale to measure gender equality attitudes. Subjects with higher scores imply that they have more equal attitudes toward gender role.

4-3. Model

I used regression model in this study. Since TSCS is a complex survey design data, it may violate the statistical assumptions of simple random sampling with replacement (SRSWR), or independent and identically distributed principle (i.i.d.) (Hou, 2011). Hou (2011) suggested that ordinary least squares estimation is inappropriate for complex survey design; instead it should use the design-weighted least squares (DWLS) method. DWLS employed variance-covariance matrix to estimate model parameters and used design degree of freedom from survey strata and primary sampling units (PSU) rather than degree of freedom from sample size. This study adopted Hou's suggestion to use DWLS estimation for regression model.

5. RESULTS

Table 1 contains information of variables which mentioned in the measurement section, with their means and standard deviations. Descriptive statistics are listed separately for men and women.

	husbands		**wives**	
	mean	s.d.	mean	s.d.
Division of household labor				
Division of labor on female-typed housework	.56	.58	.77	.64
Division of labor on male-typed housework	.69	.65	.52	.72
Live with elder generations				

Live with husband's parents (1=yes)	.28	-	.28	-
Live with wives' parents (1=yes)	.02	-	.05	-
Economic resources				
Relative daily financial support of husbands' parents	-.85	.67	-.59	.71
Relative daily financial support of wives' parents	-.50	.53	-.61	.62
Event-based financial support of husbands' parents (1=yes)	.59	-	.54	-
Event-based financial support of wives' parents (1=yes)	.30	-	.40	-
Respondent Formal education years	12.40	3.60	11.81	3.78
Economic attributes				
Respondent current work status				
Full-time	.69		.54	-
Part-time	.05	-	.03	-
Family business	.07	-	.10	-
Housewife/househusband	0	-	.28	-
No job or retired	.19	-	.05	-
Demographic attributes				
Gender (1=female)	.54	-	.46	-
Age	48.79	11.25	45.63	10.99
Father's ethnicity				
Minnan	.71	-	.73	-
Hakka	.15		.13	-
Mainland	.13		.09	-
Native	.01		.03	-
Foreigners	0		.02	-
Mother's formal education years	4.67	3.97	4.83	3.80
Gender equality attitudes	12.15	2.74	12.53	2.82

[Table1: Descriptive Statistics for Major Variables (n=901)]

Scores of division of household labor are positive. As descriptions about the measurement of dependent variables, when scores are positive, it indicates that the division of household tasks is basically gendered. It is usually women who do female-typed tasks more often their husbands, and it is men who do male-typed tasks more often than their wives. If we see table 2 as complementary purpose, the same pattern persisted. Most wives, about 68 to 76%, are doing female-typed tasks, such as cooking, washing and cleaning, more often than their husbands. In most families (about 64%), men are doing male-typed tasks more often than their wives.

	female-typed tasks			male-typed tasks
	cooking dinner	washing cloth	cleaning house	repairing
wives do housework more frequently than husbands	75.92	75.58	68.37	7.49
couples do housework equal frequently	17.43	16.98	22.09	28.49
husbands do housework more frequently than wives	6.66	7.44	9.54	64.02

[Table 2: Percentage Distribution of Married Couples' Division of Household Labor (%) (n=901)]

Table 1 also points out that about 28% respondents, both men and women, live with husbands' parents, while others don't. About 5% women live with their parents (wives' parents), while only 2% men live with their spouses' parents. Average of relative daily financial support of husbands' and wives' parents are both negative. It shows that in both situations, couples give their parents or their spouses' parents daily financial resources more often than these parents give them. When looking at event-based financial support, more than 54% couples once received event-based financial assistance from husbands' parents, either accepting properties, such as houses or lands, or getting money for buying a house, paying rent or running a business. About 30 to 40% respondents received wives' parents event-based financial assistance. Respondents' average formal education

attainments are near 12 years, which is about high school level. Major current working status of men and women are full-time workers. The second major working statuses are different between men and women. The second major female working status is housekeepers (housewives). For men, the second major working status is no job or retired. Average ages of respondents are about middle aged (46 to 49 years old). Major respondents' father ethnicity is Minnan. Mothers' formal education years are low (nearly 5 years), which is about primary school. Average scores of gender equality attitude is moderate (about 12), which the maximum score of this variable is 20.

	Division of female-typed tasks
Variables associate with husbands' parents	
Live with husbands' parents (1=yes)	.309 **
	(.104)
Relative daily financial support of husbands' parents	-.065
	(.048)
Event-based financial support of husbands' parents (1=yes)	.117 †
	(.069)
Live with husbands' parents X Relative daily financial support	.157 †
	(.087)
Live with husbands' parents X Event-based financial support	-.174 *
	(.082)
Variables associate with wives' parents	
Live with wives' parents (1=yes)	-.052
	(.237)
Relative daily financial support of wives' parents	.007
	(.042)
Event-based financial support of wives' parents (1=yes)	-.060
	(.047)
Live with wives' parents X Relative daily financial support	.045
	(.239)
Live with wives' parents X Event-based financial support	.121

	(.276)
Respondent Formal education years	-.029 **
	(.009)
Economic attributes	
Respondent current work status	
Part-time	-.187
	(.221)
Family business	.207
	(.147)
Housewife/househusband	.440 **
	(.089)
No job or retired	.023
	(.150)
(Full-time=0)	
Demographic attributes	
Gender (1=female)	.075
	(.049)
Age	.006
	(.004)
Father's ethnicity (Minnan=1)	.079
	(.053)
Mother's formal education years	-.008
	(.009)
Gender equality attitudes	-.014
	(.009)
Intercept	.713 *
	(.296)
N	523
R-squared	.172

Standard errors in parentheses. †p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01.

[Table3: Regression Coefficients of Division of Female-typed Tasks]

Table 3 and table 4 contains regression of coefficients on division of household labor. There are two outcome variables. One is division of female-typed tasks(see table 3). The other is male-typed tasks(see table 4). Both use the same research model to examine the effects.

When viewing the intercepts of both models, positive intercepts also point that the division of female-typed tasks (β0=.713, p<.05) and division of male-typed tasks (β0=.253, p<.01) are basically gendered. Women usually do female-typed housework more often than husbands, and men often do male-typed housework more frequently than their wives.

When examining effects of co-resident parents on couples' gendered division of household tasks, results shows that living with husbands' parents has a positive effect on division of female-typed tasks (β=.309, p<.01), which influences wives do feminine housework more frequently than their husbands. The effect is not clear on division of male-typed tasks. Variable of living with wives' parents doesn't have significant effect on division of female-typed or male-typed tasks.

Main effect of event-based financial support of husbands' parents has a positive effect on division of female-typed tasks (β=.117, p<.1), that means once husbands' parents gave couples certain amount of money or properties, it tends to increase wives' frequency of doing feminine tasks. Relative daily financial of husbands' parents are not significant.

When regarding the interaction effects of living with husbands' parents and financial support variables, both interaction terms are significant. When couples are co-resident with husbands' parents, and husbands' parents give daily financial resources more often to couples, it has a positive effect on female-typed tasks division (β=.157, p<.1), that also enhance wives to do feminine housework more often. When couples are living with husbands' parents, and couples once received husbands' parents' event-based financial support, it has a negative effect on division of female-typed tasks (β=-.174, p<.05), which cause wives to do female-typed tasks less often.

	Division of male-typed tasks
Variables associate with husbands' parents	
Live with husbands' parents (1=yes)	-.021
	(.113)
Relative daily financial support of husbands' parents	-.095
	(.070)

Event-based financial support of husbands' parents (1=yes)	-.061
	(.083)
Live with husbands' parents X Relative daily financial support	-.010
	(.080)
Live with husbands' parents X Event-based financial support	.028
	(.118)
Variables associate with wives' parents	
Live with wives' parents (1=yes)	.192
	(.315)
Relative daily financial support of wives' parents	-.109 *
	(.052)
Event-based financial support of wives' parents (1=yes)	-.079
	(.061)
Live with wives' parents X Relative daily financial support	.045
	(.208)
Live with wives' parents X Event-based financial support	-.383
	(.294)
Respondent Formal education years	-.003
	(.013)
Economic attributes	
Respondent current work status	
Part-time	.008
	(.140)
Family business	-.095
	(.112)
Housewife/househusband	-.048
	(.108)
No job or retired	-.008
	(.107)

(Full-time=0)	
Demographic attributes	
Gender (1=female)	-.197 **
	(.052)
Age	-.009 *
	(.004)
Father's ethnicity (Minnan=1)	.051
	(.077)
Mother's formal education years	.018 *
	(.008)
Gender equality attitudes	-.023 *
	(.010)
Intercept	.253 **
	(.305)
N	520
R-squared	.092

Standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05, **p<.01.

[Table4: Regression Coefficients of Division of Male-typed Tasks]

Examining research model on division of male-typed tasks(see table 4), only one major variable is significant. Relative daily financial resources of wives' parents have a negative effect on division of masculine tasks (β=-.109, p<.05). It implies that when wives' parents give more daily financial support to focal couples, husbands will tend to do masculine tasks less frequently.

Results of control variables are illustrated as following. When respondents have high education attainments, focal couples has a less gendered division of female-typed tasks(β=-.029, p<.01) (see table 3). If respondents are housekeepers, couples tend to have a gendered division of feminine housework(β=.440, p<.01). When respondents are female, the division of male-typed tasks is less gendered(β=-.197, p<.01) (see table 4). This is probably because of respondents' response preference. When respondents' age are older, the division of masculine housework is less gendered(β =-.009, p<.05). If respondents' mothers have high education attainments, couples tend to have a gendered division of male-typed housework (β = .018, p<.05). When respondents have higher gender equality scores, couples tend to have a less gendered division of masculine tasks(β =-.023, p<.05).

6. DISCUSSION

In this article, I propose a study to discuss whether co-resident family members influence the division of household labor between focal couples. Based on the framework of "doing gender" (West and Zimmerman 1987), I suggest that focal couples still perform gendered division of household labor nowadays. The main argument in this study is that couples tend to have a gendered division of household labor when co-residing with their parents. In light of social exchange theory (Blau [1986] 1992; Emerson 1962), I also argue that economic resources parents give to focal couples will increase parents' authoritative influence on couples. With the moderation effect of financial resources, co-resident parents will gain more authority, and couples will have a more gendered division of housework.

The findings of this study support gender perspectives. In regression models, both divisions of female-typed and male-typed tasks are gendered. Women still do female-typed housework more often, and men do male-typed housework more frequently in most households. Chang and Li (2007) also had a similar finding.

Current findings are also congruent with the two hypotheses posed in this study. Hypothesis 1 predicts that couples with co-resident parents will have a more gendered division of household tasks. This hypothesis is supported on the division of female-typed tasks. Couples living with husbands' parents tend to have a gendered division of feminine housework. Wives may tend to do female-typed housework more often due to husbands' parents presence in the same house.

Hypothesis 2 predicts that financial resources parents possess act a moderation role on the effects of co-resident parents have on couples' division of household labor. This hypothesis is supported by the results of husbands' parents' economic resources on the division of female-typed tasks as well. When husbands' parents co-reside with focal couples, and husbands' parents give daily economic support more often than couples pay back, couples tend to have a gendered division on female-typed tasks.

However, interesting patterns are also observed in the interaction term of living with husbands' parents and event-based financial support. According to hypothesis 2 prediction, the interaction term from event-based financial support should increase the division of female-typed tasks. However, it shows a reducing effect, which is different from the positive effect of another economic resource variable, relative daily financial support. Relative daily financial support that husbands' parents possess provides authoritative sources of gradual, persistent influence. Therefore, husbands' parents who repeatedly give daily financial support could sustain their authoritative influence on the couples. But event-based financial support only occurred in a specific time point. After the 'event' passes, the authoritative effect may decrease gradually. Highest authoritative influence should occur at the time when husbands' parents gave couples resources. When the time

becomes longer, even husbands' parents living with focal couples, it is not effective for husbands' parents to claim authoritative influence from past given resources. Thus, this may be the reason why interaction effect of event-based financial support and living with husbands' parents show a descending effect.

Although the interaction term of co-residence with wives' parents and wives' parents' relative daily financial support is not significant, main effect of wives' parents' relative daily financial resources on male-typed tasks is negative. This effect differs from social exchange theoretical expectation which presumes an enhancing effect. It seems that while wives' parents provide daily financial resources to couples more often, couples' division of male-typed tasks tends to be less gendered. These husbands are less responsible for male-typed tasks. It seems to suggest that the family dynamics in households living with wives' parents may be different from those families co-resident with husbands' parents. Future studies are needed to reveal these remaining puzzles about family dynamics and to disclose why financial resources husbands' or wives' parents retain produce different consequences on the division of domestic labor between couples.

To summarize, this study found that co-residence with parents has influence on division of housework between couples. Specifically, living with husbands' parents and financial resources factors both have effect on division of female-typed tasks between couples. This study underlines the importance to incorporate family structures and family dynamics into the analysis framework. These factors may shed more lights on gendered division of labor in future studies.

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How do Muslim women speak? Hijabers Community and Visual Representations

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1. Introduction

In November 2013, Semi Marcella, a young Chinese-Indonesian woman posted a picture on Instagram (Figure 1) of herself donning veil and included it in #hijabers with a caption "ahaha I swear I'm still a Catholic"[1]. She wears a striped shirt with semi-transparent veil, thrown in a manner that one would identify as a hijaber style: a thin veil circling around the head, creating an effect of layering. She does not shy away from the fact that the style is interesting enough for her to try out and to be shared on a social network site like Instagram, despite being a non-Muslim woman.

Semi Marcella's post, though may sound controversial, does not receive any comment, perhaps because her post is burried under about 475,000 pictures tagged with #hijabers on Instagram. Dian Pelangi's posts, however, always receive hundreds of comments, which are almost always positive, full of adoring Muslim women who are inspired by her style and endeavor in promoting veiling and Muslim fashion to young women. Dian is one of the founders of Hijabers Community and also a fashion designer. Her Instagram is mostly used to update her 320,000 followers on her activities. She doesn't tag her pictures with #hijabers, but everytime she posts a picture of her outfit; it always generates comments of inspired followers, identifying her as part of the hijaber role model. Dian replies only to comments made by her friends or questions that may relate to events that she's attending or promotional items. That attitude, however, does not hinder her followers from continuously praising her sartorial choices. Figure 2, for example, is one of her recent posts in November 2013, with a caption, originally in English: "Heading to Mushola Al-Ikhlas Puri Bintaro 18-19-20 Bintaro Jaya Sektor 9 for @TaklimRemaja with me and Ust. Afdholi on 9am :) we will talk about 'Kiat & Kunci Sukses Rasulullah' Thank you mba @dewisandra for

[11] Translated from the original caption in Indonesian: "#Hijabers#hijabers#iseng ahaha sumpah gue masih katolik kok^^"

the invitation! :) so who's comiiiing? ;) see you there soon InsyAllah! :)". Her invitation for the event is replied by some followers, but most of the comments give remarks on her choice of outfit and her bag.

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4

On the other hand, Zaskia Sungkar's account (@zaskiasungkar15) on Instagram received somewhat more varied comments about the way she dresses, compared to Dian Pelangi. One of

the reasons is her popularity as an actress and a singer in Indonesia, and the other is her recent decision on donning veil. Using her Instagram account, she also displays more creative way of veiling, as she is a fashion enthusiast and an avid traveller. She is keen on updating her 151,000 followers on her outfit of the day looks as she visits different tourist attractions around the globe. Although she does not identify herself as part of the Hijabers Community, she herself has started clothing line named Hijabi Fashionista,[2] and her style of veiling is often identified by her followers as 'hijabers'. This may be one of the reasons why she sometimes received negative comments or 'advises on moral' from her followers.

One instance is when she posted in October 2013 (Figure 3) a picture of her enjoying a cupcake in England. This photo is not her usual 'outfit of the day' post, as she seems to try to make a funny face while indulging on her food, following the caption "Taste hmmmm hmm so good". However, this picture turns out to trigger a number of negative comments from her followers, questioning her 'improper' way of wearing veil. Out of 139 comments, most of them praises her stylish appearance, but about 28 of them blatantly problematizes how her neck is showing, while about 5 of them question the commenters intention of attacking Zaskia. At some point of the thread, one user (@aisyramaa) reminds the commenter on how Zaskia herself does not fuss with all the commenters' concern: "No one's attacking anybody…We're just reminding her…Don't fight about it..Zaskia herself doesn't seem to mind.."[3] Indeed, Zaskia does not respond to any of the negative comments. Another picture of her (Figure 4), for example, was posted in September 2013, showing her eating a large cotton candy with a friend while wearing a red headgear and a shawl to cover her neck. This apparently bother a user (@kartika_0): "that saskia, is she wearing hijab or what?…kia please if you wear hijab don't cover the head and hair only okay[4] :)" followed by "I'm sorry if my comment seem rude".[5] This post seems to create a debate, that finally one user (@skybag), using English, comments: "People please mind ur own business.

[2] http://www.noor-magazine.com/2013/10/zaskia-sungkar-bismillah-go/

[3] Translated from Indonesian: "Prasaan nggak ada yg menghujat.. Semua hny mengingatkan.. Gausa diributin.. Zaskianya sndri aja kalem2 aja.."

[4] Translated from Indonesian: "itu si saskia pake hijab apa apa?…kia tolong kalau pakai hijab bukan hanya sekedar nutupin kepala rambut yaaa :)"

[5] Translated from Indonesian: "maaf kalo saya lancang komen"

Let her be herself and put urself in front of murror,r u perfect?", while Zaskia herself respond to none.

The three Instagram accounts mentioned above circle around the topic of Muslim women in urban Indonesia and the now common term 'hijaber', which has been around for more than 3 years in the country. The word hijaber itself is formed from the Arabic word *hijab* (which can be translated literally as curtain or partition and is closely linked with the Qur'anic order for women to cover), and the suffix "-er" from English grammar. Hijaber can be seen as a strand of veiling practices popular in Muslim woman population in Indonesia. It should, however, not be read as the next version of *jilbab funky* (Nef-Saluz, 2007) or *jilbab gaul* (Jones, 2010) once trendy in early 2000 Indonesia and continue to be popular amongst Muslim women in the country, but as another form of covering oneself created by upper/middle class, educated, creative young Muslim women, received and reinterpreted by the growing urban Muslim population in Indonesia as one way to express piety.

The general idea of "hijaber" is often identified with the play with colorful clothing while also nudging the 'limits' of veiling styles that is considered proper. Most of the hijabers would play around their veiling style, creating intricate layering with pashmina or shawl (which then deserve their own how-to videos on Youtube and on their blogs) or even wearing *turban*, a type of headwear that is often associated with men in Central and South Asia (although in some culture are also worn by women). They would then combine the headgears with colorful outfits. One that is often considered to be questionable (and thus often receive a lot of comments in blogs, Instagram, and Facebook) is the combination of tight clothing or tops that reveal parts of the neck and arms. This is then often taken further and accessorized with designer bags and also trendy shoes, most often heels. Although this combination changes as the playfulness of outfit trends transform over time, hijaber styles suggest a sense of ownership, which will be discussed below. The Muslim women donning the hijaber style (both identifying themselves as one or identified by others) are those who are seemingly aware of what they are wearing and understand that what they wear are stylish and, at the same time, playful. Other than creating new forms of hybridity, this also suggests the importance of veiling as a practice adopted by Muslim women, which becomes one of the reason that make this category of style desirable, even for non-Muslim women, like Semi Marcella above. Moreover, the active participation that these women take in archiving photographic images and representing themselves visually, both in print and digital forms—which

will be discussed later in this paper—insists a new reading for Muslim women's agency and the idea of visuality, in relation to visual representations and female participation in the spectacle.

Piety is public in Indonesia (Paramaditha, 2010; Subijanto, 2011; Fealy and White, 2008) and it rarely relates to merely the personal. The matter sits on representational issues and the categorization of different expressions that Muslim women in Indonesia's urban areas prefer. The problematic of urban Muslim women in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, invokes historical traces of past authoritarian government, one that has been dealt with various attempts, mostly in political spheres (Rinaldo, 2010). "Non-political movement" in the country can be arguably represented with Hijabers Community (HC): started as an informal gathering of young, creative Muslim women in Jakarta, which now has garnered excitements, resulting in 'branches' in Indonesian cities. The community holds Qur'an reciting gatherings and sermons as often as it holds make-up and hijab tutorial classes. It narrates itself as a social group that emphasizes on the use of *hijab* (rather than the common Indonesian term for veil: *jilbab*); therefore making its existence closely linked with Muslim women who identify themselves as hijabers. Its main tools to reach out for members are instant messaging, website, blogs and Social Network Sites (SNS) such as Facebook, Twitter and Youtube. In 2011-2012, it branches out to other Indonesian cities via the same media. HC celebrates the religious tradition in a contemporary way: they are colorful and fun, they are personal—to the extent that each *Muslimah* (Muslim woman) can go their 'own' way in representing their piety their veiling—as well as communal. This 'celebration', however, has not been taken lightly by the public. Comments and opinions, as will be discussed in this paper, aim to undermine the plausibility of such veiling practices within the framework of what is considered by Indonesian society as "Islamic". The non-response from Zaskia Sungkar, for example, becomes the epitome of the idea of hijaber style as well as the attitude that the hijabers choose.

As Muslim women are often considered to be a representation of the *umma*'s purity (cooke, 2007), the problematic is not new in urban Muslim societies. For instance, the relationship between consumption and piety are more often considered representative of vain Muslim women, rather than as efforts to replenish gaps created by urban, fast-changing life in the metropolis. Jones (2010) analyzes that Muslim women enjoy fashionable attires as means of pious expression, although they are often critiqued as highly consumptive and conceited by both sides: the liberal and the religious. The changing forms of Muslim women gatherings, exemplified by HC, (along with public's subverting perception of the often considered as vernacular practice) urge the

inquiry of where can these Muslim women actually "speak" without subversion and when they do, how? This question does not trivialize the importance of the content of the gatherings or the heterogeneity of the women themselves, but rather investigates the threads of popular Islamic discourse of "apt performance" (Asad 1986 in Jones, 2010) in urban Indonesia. This paper, therefore, argues that the visual, circulated via print and digital media, becomes the vehicle in which the Muslim women "speak", using two photography books published by the members of HC to see how the community engage with visual representations, as well as Instagram posts with 'hijabers' hashtag (#) observed for three months (August-October) in 2012 and another three months (April-June) 2013 followed by responses on hijabers style circulating on the cyberspace.

To argue that visual representations become the vehicle to 'speak' for the hijabers is not to undermine the function of HC events or Quran gatherings, but rather to explore the potential that the spectacular medium has in the politics of representations, which reconfigures an imagination of contemporary urban Muslim women. Moreover, to make sense of the public debate on the apt performance of the veiled Muslim women, I would like to deploy Talal Asad's view on Islamic traditions (1986). Asad believes that Islamic discursive traditions require argumentative reasoning as its foundation. The traditions are not homogeneous, but rather are always looking for coherence by continuoysly referring to orthodoxy, which for Asad should be seen as a form of power relations, in which Muslims "regulate, uphold, require or adjust *correct* practices, and to condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace *incorrect* ones" (15). Therefore, in light of the negative comments discussed in this paper, debates on apt performance should be understood as part of the tradition(s), not as hostility or signs of religious belief in crisis.[6]

2. Visual Representations of the Hijabers

Two books were published by HC committee members, focusing on styling oneself. The first book was a product of all the members of HC committee, and the second one is authored by Dian Pelangi, following the trend of street style photography books. The first one, *Hijab Style by*

[6] As an illustration, in 2012, focusing on Aquila Asia, a Muslim women lifestyle magazine, I discussed how 'modern' Muslim women in Southeast Asia were catered by various lifestyle publications. Yet, discussions on the cyberspace via Aquila Asia's page have more often invited protests and negative comments from Muslim women in non-Southeast Asian regions, arguing the validity of the Islamic practices. This should suggest the continuous presence of debates among Muslims themselves.

Hijabers Community (2012), is said to be the official book of Hijabers Community. The book profiles the style of 28 members of the Hijabers Community committee; embodying the spirit of creativity that the community emphasizes and also the fact that hijab should be a positive force, not fear or rigidity:

> "We want Muslimahs out there to have no fear in working (*berkarya*) and becoming creative with their skills and interests. Make hijab the force for positive attitude, not for fear and rigidity in working (*berkarya*) and socializing."

The introduction part in the book (3) stresses the importance of working in form of craftsmanship (*berkarya*), which induces self-cultivation through hijab, and also the importance not to appear rigid to others (noting on the importance of socializing). The community imagines itself as a place for Muslim women who want to 'own' their veiling style, as an expression of creativity. However, for them, creativity and flexibility are not outside God's orders. Moreover, the testimonial section of the book, titled "inspirations start from here" notes the committee members' stories of wearing the veil as a form of self-cultivation that is not perfect but is always aiming for piety (28-29). In this book, agency is "spoken" for by the young women who consider themselves as representatives of the community. Their capacity for action is pushed further, not for revolution or as an act of resistance (Mahmood, 2005:8). Most of these women are businesswomen involved in designing and production of Islamic fashion in Indonesia. This capacity of leading a business and being involved in public sphere, nevertheless, is not seen as a potential of "liberate" oneself from the Islamic traditions, but they are seen as an opportunity to celebrate and promote Islam with their own interpretations that remain in the domain of piety.

These women are pictured in tutorials, so that the readers can copy their veiling styles. Each committee member shows how one can achieve the veiling style that looks different. The veil can be a loose drape around the head, as the forehead and the neck are covered with *ciput ninja*[7] or styled in such a way using pashmina and pins. These women do not disappear in the crowd of 28 women, as they personalized each veiling style that one member can wear bright flowery outfit while another one use color blocking. All of them, however, cover their chest and wear loose clothing items, which cannot be considered as a coincidence as comments on hijaber

[7] A tight headgear popular because of the hijaber style.

seem to swirl around the fact that Muslim women following hijabers style 'defy' the basic rules of wearing veil. Their effort can be seen as a reconfiguration of women's position in Islamic traditions in urban Indonesian society, carried out as they inhabit norms and ethics. These women show that docility required by the Islamic traditions (as well as by the Muslim society) is performed by donning the hijab, and it is aimed for modesty and continuous commitment with God by cultivating oneself through sartorial options.

On the other hand, Dian Pelangi's *Hijab Street Style* (2012) is a photography book on hijaber style that does not provide tutorials. It is a photography book by definition, with pages after pages of photography images lacking text, formatted following the popular Scott Schumann's book, *The Sartorialist* (2009) as Dian Pelangi admits that she is inspired by Schumann's skills in photographing street style.[8] The consciousness of copying an idea from a photographer who developed his career and popularity through blogging, just like Dian, may be considered as a form of mimicry that is always ambivalent, lacking and repeating (Bhabha, 1984). However, its twist on collecting images of only Muslim women who follow Dian's interpretation on the practice of veiling (hence the invisibility of Muslim women who covers herself in longer veils and muted colors) should be considered as a form of resemblance that is erratic and, therefore, potential for different readings. About 700 images of Muslim women living in 17 cities of Indonesia, Singapore, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur are curated by Dian to proffer an idea of Muslim women who "are committed in showing their love for Allah by covering themselves, and combining it with the global trends" (2012:10-11). Colorfulness and awareness of style become important traits of the images of the Muslimah in the book—and even of the two images of men styling themselves in traditional Malayan clothing. The book does not preach as much as the *Hijab Style* one, and instead chooses to 'speak' through the lack of text. It presents the commonality of hijaber style across different cities and Southeast Asian countries, and at the same time serves its readers another possibility of representing the Muslims as 'normal' members of urban societies, as images after images show familiarity with the idea of the life in the city—a blurry one for that matter, as backgrounds are not focused, and readers would not be able to really tell which city each person is from had Dian not categorized them. The sweeping harmony of the photographs in showing who "hijabers" are may relate to Dian's editing skills and perhaps her goal for the book. However, this also shows how she, a central figure in HC as well as Islamic fashion industry in the

[8] http://blog.dianpelangi.com/2011/08/sartorialist.html

country, does not make a distinction of traditional, regional characteristic, an idea often conveyed in representing Indonesia, and rather focuses on the quality which makes a Muslim woman who cover herself a part of this concept called the 'hijaber'. This, arguably, make the concept a unifying channel for the Muslim women to 'speak' with one another, across cities and countries.

Using RSS, I followed pictures listed with hashtag #hijabers through Webstagram. Most faces appear in the #hijabers look Malayan, indicating strong relations with Southeast Asian Muslims. This pushes the idea that the dissemination of the concept of 'hijaber', as Dian Pelangi's book demonstrates, is more intensive in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, and thus helps understanding the contemporary situation of the urban, technology literate youth. Pictures tagged as #hijabers mostly illustrate how these young women indulge themselves in fashion, shopping, make-up and beauty. In average, seventy items are posted daily with this tag. Moreover, I see patterns that might help us understanding the mapping of the idea of 'hijaber' in this "digital-photographic realities" (Bloomer, 1990 in Chandler & Livingston, 2012).

First, as Instagram functions as a form of transfer of the concept of space, it becomes a site where these young Muslim women show where they have been. Places like malls, restaurants and travel spots become important. Of course, this may not be specific to Muslim women; nevertheless, this shows how photologging sites like Instagram becomes important in disseminating middle-class lifestyles, where one visits different, interesting places.[9] Second, hijaber brings the idea of colorful, fun Muslim women which leads to the immersion of Muslim into the 'modernity'. Those adjectives is not only reserved for clothes and style, but also the faces of the young women themselves. These Indonesian women, who wear 'hijab' in different colors, are now standing side by side with the stereotyped black, dark, gloomy idea of Arabic veils. It offers a new appearance for the 'face' of Muslim. They wear make-up and proud in doing so (thus, the uploads to Instagram).

Interestingly, as the popularity of Instagram expands, so does the variety of Muslimah tagging their pictures in Instagram. There are at least three changes that I have noticed. First, online shops have started to take advantage. The #hijabers #hijabista are constantly used not only by young Muslim women, but also by novel entrepreneurs, trying to sell products that they consider related to the style of 'hijaber'. Second, the popularity of Instagram as a platform has

[9] This idea also brings up the very notion of 'being' in different places, which might goes back to the ability to travel as a part of luxury, which represents certain class.

welcomed the emergence of Instagram celebrity—which, I believe, links the social networking sites even further to celebrity culture. Users have started to idolize the women picturing themselves as beautiful yet pious Muslim women. Third, it opens Instagram to different classes of women as Instagram expands to Android and other mobile operating system. Its expansion interestingly has opened up the hash tags to, for instance, middle school female students wearing school uniforms and veils, tagging their pictures with #hijabers.

These changes have indeed redefined the term 'hijaber', framing the term as an open-ended label, given to different kinds of Muslim women in Indonesia. The interesting changes that the hijabers trend and hashtag on Instagram have brought about also invited distrust and questions from the public of their 'creativity' in interpreting the hijab. It has caused a 'counter movement'.[10] Negative comments are most often directed on the Instagram account right away and some others hover around other social network sites, such as Twitter. Some acts as if they are able to advise the hijabers, others sarcastically mock the choice of style.[11]

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[10] One account in Instagram called @modestmuhaajaba states that it is an account for "Chest-covering-non-skinny-jeans-non-body-hugging-non-turban-excessive-makeup/jewelry-hijabis for modest outfit inspiration" (http://web.stagram.com/n/modestmuhaajaba/).

[11] Some examples from Twitter:

@Ifanharijanto: perhatian untuk hijabers, salah memilih hijab bisa kena hisab.. #prihatin melihat berjilbab namun membentuk lekukan tubuh seperti bikini!! (hijabers please be informed, you may be in hisab because you choose the wrong hijab,, #concerned seeing women veiled but showing the body shape just like bikini!!) (10:56 PM, 16 Jul 2012);

@Hijabers_BIDAR: hindari pakaian yang ketat (avoid tight clothing items) (9:00 PM, 10 Dec 2012);

@AzyyatiZulkifli: Islam itu mudah. Tp mengapa masih ada yg sanggup melilit leher dgn tudung kononnya fesyen hijabista. Tudung tu kn molek kalau menutupi dada. (Islam is easy. But why there are still some women who coil around the tudung calling it fashion hijabista. Tudung is beautiful when it covers the chest.) (8:11 PM, 12 April 2013);

@Jstattaubah: #Hijabers itu keren kalau syar'i, bukan Hijabers ngasal. Panjang & tanpa lekukan / itu sj syarat-nya. Mudah kan? #Hijab #Jilbab #Kerudung (#Hijabers are cool when syar'i, not messy Hijabers. Long and shapeless / those are the requirements. Easy right? #Hijab #Jilbab #Kerudung) (6:00 PM, 20 Jan 2013);

Others published their opinion online through channels of a more 'traditional' Islamic websites such as *Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, which focuses on scriptural references, advising Muslim women not to publicize their beauty, as it is against the purpose of veiling.[12] *Muslimah*, another website that actively promotes a more syar'i way of life for Muslim women, got caught up with their own usual opinionated piece published on its Facebook page, titled "Fenomena 'Hijaber' dan 'Jilbaber' Dalam Pandangan Syariat Islam" ('Hijaber' and 'Jilbaber' Phenomenon Viewed from Islamic *Syari'a*),[13] questioning the creativity of the hijabers, who often said that they want to look beautiful for other people. The notion of other people, in the piece, should be limited to spouse and family, and thus making the hijabers creativity sinful and potential for *fitna* (upheaval). This piece received approval from most of the commenters, while it is also questioned by some for giving the idea that Muslim women are constantly at fault.

3. The Speaking Muslim Woman

Veiling practices should be seen as a manifestation of embodied capacities for action, which can be considered as agency that is expressed "under specific conditions of subordination" or inhibition of norms (Mahmood 2005 in Bautista, 2008:79). To see the veil as simply practical or as a symbol of resistance would mean to ignore "Islamic virtues of female modesty or piety" (Mahmood 2005:16) that Muslim women choose take on. Movements like HC and subjectivities they represent cannot be read simply as a resistance towards the "West" or an act of women's submission. Saba Mahmood argues that the binary of subversion and liberation would only limit analysis on socioreligious communities because agency can take form in docility and it may also inhabit, rather than going against, norms. (Mahmood, 2005:14-15).

This paper has focused on the two ways Muslim women who identify themselves as hijabers representing themselves through photographic images. In arguing that visual

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@Prematthur: Wuh! RT @bagussatyanm: hijabers punuk unta dan ketat ketat asoi RT @prematthur Hijabers dong (Whoa! RT @bagussatyanm: hijabers with camel hump and awesome tights RT @prematthur Hijabers, eh) (8:34 AM, 29 Jun 2012);

@Afictionheroes: Dibalik hijabers berbaju ketat, selalu ada pria yang ngga kuat (Behind hijabers with tight clothing, there's always a weak man behind) (12:07 AM, 10 Oct 2012)

[12] http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/?p=59856

[13] https://www.facebook.com/muslimah.or.id/posts/10152824591965195

representations become the vehicle to 'speak' for the hijabers, this study explores the potential that the spectacular medium has in representing the subjects, allowing their agentival capacity to form an imagination of contemporary urban Muslim women, who are self-conscious in interpreting veiling practices and able to not disrupt debates on their veiling practices, but rather take part in the Islamic traditions by 'speaking to'[14] the orthodoxy through continuous reproduction of photographic images.

"Images convey information, afford pleasure and displeasure, influence style, determine consumption and mediate power relations" (Rogoff, 2002:25). With the definition, the power relations in Islamic traditions can be arguably mediated through images produced by the hijabers. Moreover, even though photographic image always bring about an idea of the omnipresent passivity, the act of recording itself is the form of photography's aggression (Sontag, 1977:4). Therefore, the very act of taking photography images that the hijabers do would affect the power relations perpetuated in Islamic traditions' orthodoxy.

The "transformative power" (Mahmood, 2005:35) that the hijaber has in representing the body and self-cultivation should be seen in its fundamental relationship with piety. Moreover, the cosmopolitan way of life as well as transnational link they have as well as their hybridity should be seen as a more complex configuration, not simply as a resistance towards the West (an approach that cooke (2007) suggests). There is a quality of *da'wa* involved, which cannot be disposed of in analyzing HC and images of hijabers. The intention of 'preaching' is important as a form of "speaking" and thus become fundamental in the way these women choose the media to express themselves.

While Brenner (1996) & Smith-Heffner (2007) sees veiling as a political tool, the stylish veiling becomes a part of public piety, giving an echo of "non-political" imagery through movie, television, magazines and consumption patterns (Hasan, 2009; Jones, 2010; Paramaditha, 2010; Subijanto, 2011). The pre-1998 veiling becomes a symbol of knowledgeable, revolutionary urban

[14] Irit Rogoff's observes that critical analysis of visual culture that should not focus on discourses that consider itself to "speak about" but rather "speaking to". She uses Trinh T. Min-ha: "Who speaks? What speaks? The question is implied and the function named, but the individual never reigns, and the subject slips away without naturalizing its voice. S/he who speaks, speaks to the tale as S/he begins telling and retelling it. S/he does not speak about it. For without a certain work of displacement, 'speaking about' only partakes the conservation of systems of binary opposition (subject/object, I/it, we/they) on which territorialized knowledge depends." (Rogoff, 2002, p.28)

Muslim women, while women who decided to veil in the 2000 melts into the sphere of non-subversive femininity. Veiling, then, becomes a part of the spectacle. The patriarchal discourse expect the ideal Muslimah, while at the same time communicating homogenizing ideals of beautiful desirable modern women. The discursive formation of Muslim builds up the idea around Muslim women who are required to embody religious norms as expressions of *taqwa* (piety), while they negotiate with different forces of capitalism continuously (as commodification of Islamic values are present in advertisings, television programs, and social network sites).

If Hijabers Community is seen as a result of those forces, the values that it propagates through the representations of its committee members allow a conscious effort of self-realization through creative ways of styling oneself distributed through visual representations. Moreover, if we see the temporality of the postings of thousands of hijabers pictures in Instagram as a form of heterotopic space (Chun, 2002), even more so with the development of web 2.0, we, therefore, need to question the narrative it wants to convey. With more than 475,000 pictures on Instagram tagged with #hijabers, we should enquire on what they are saying. Can the pictures archived on Instagram 'speak'? And when they do, are they 'speaking about' or 'speaking to'?

In answering the question, we should consider how these women are engrossed in their desire to become a part of the spectacle, to be photographed, and to be published in an instant through digital form. Muslim women's active participation in the cultural politics of representations through photographic images should allow a questioning of the case of visuality and visual culture. Talal Asad notes how "widespread homogeneity is a function not of tradition, but of the development and control of communication techniques that are part of modern industrial societies" (1986:16). This is to say that Islamic traditions and Muslim societies has often been imagined and/or represented as one homogeneous society, from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. Images of Muslim women are often published as rigid, submissive, and problematic (Richardson, 2004; Jones, 2010). In this case, visuality, which can be defined as imaginary practice created from information, images, and ideas (Mirzoeff, 2011:2), is, more often than not, takes side on the cultural discourse that represents Muslims as exotic, submissive and "not yet" modern.

However, visuality itself is never total. The issue has been taken up by Nicholas Mirzoeff (2006, 2011), as he glosses over Dipesh Chakrabarty's (2000) reading on the modes of history: History 1 and History 2. He then extends the definition for visuality, making Visuality 1 a "narrative that concentrates on the formation of a coherent and intelligible pictures of modernity that allowed for practical, even heroic, action," while Visuality 2 "would be that picturing of the

self or collective that exceeds or precedes that incorporation into the commodification of vision by capital and empire" (2006:66).

It can be argued, therefore, that the hijabers' representations of themselves, amid the negative comments—which can actually be helpful in making the topic consistently popular since 2010—can be considered as a form of Visuality 2. The constant reproduction of images and public discussions produce an alternative visual imagery of the Muslim women. However, this is not to say or expect a liberating effort from the Hijabers Community as a movement or hijabers as a category, as Mirzoeff notes that Visuality 2 "is not necessarily politically radical or progressive" (2011:24).

4. Conclusion

Muslim women are expected to represent norm, and they do indeed give heed to norm as part of their value. They don't subvert the male authority, but they condition themselves to be allowed to have their own version or style of hijab. This, of course, does not mean that previous Muslim women wearing hijab do not "own their style" but rather we should take into account how this possibility of styling oneself is then translated to continuous reinterpretation of the veil, by constantly proliferating the images. The ease of producing photographic images facilitates the hijabers to continuously reinterpret the veiling practice. They receive negative comments, but once the images are published and posted, representations are constantly produced. The readers or the followers are interacting with the images, whether they are for or against the choices of style. The hijabers capacity in normalizing the colorful unconventional hijab in combination with what commonly known as "Western" products and modern, urban lifestyle is then able to narrate a different reading on Muslim women. Their ability to 'speak' through visuality proffers complexity in the current strand of modern visual culture, one that has become a product of the "collision, intersection and interaction of Visuality 1 and Visuality 2, between capital's picturing of the world and that which cannot be commodified or disciplined" (Mirzoeff, 2006:66).

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Reflexive Cosmopolitanism and Sexual Identity: A Study of Sexuality in South Korea via Male Bisexuality [1]

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Abstract

The development of articulations of sexual identities may linguistically rely heavily on adoption of similar queer terminologies, however the factors that account for those identities are not universal. The nuances in meanings have led to problems of using Western methodologies to promote those identities. This is especially the case in which accepted umbrella ideologies such as human rights and nuanced identities such as 'gay' become issues that extend even transnationally, which poses not only a danger on the domestic integrity of countries like those of the East, but also threatens to condense such identities into malformed, mismatched, and in inappropriate ways.

The results of this interview-based study showed that while countries like the U.S., which plays strong influential roles in media and academia in South Korea, currently battles with deconstructing the hetero-homosexual dichotomy, South Korea is vigorously constructing it. In addition, while the dynamics of identity politics have taken root in South Korea, the queer combatants are still in negotiation in terms of how to define themselves and in what ways these definitions will adequately account for addressing the social factors they must deal with—such as fulfilling traditional patriarchal duties, avoiding risks, asserting sexual individualism, acting as agents of identity, and so on.

The existence of bisexuals fundamentally changes both the meaning of "gei" in Korea and also leads to a need to reassess how discrimination against queers in the country is being handled. In particular, the rise of the anti-homophobia agenda not only leads to added pressures on self-identified bisexualities but also further marginalizes their existence. Bisexuality in South Korea is increasingly becoming tied to the hetero-homosexual paradigm—even though, as found via research in this thesis, bisexuality in South Korea is not necessarily intrinsically linked to either heterosexuality or homosexuality. Rather, bisexuality is an internalized sexuality that is tied to relationship fulfillment and sexual intimacy.

> "…the concrete institutional forms of sexuality at any given time and place are products of human activity. They are imbued with conflicts of interest and political maneuvring, both deliberate and incidental. In that sense, sex is always political. But there are also

historical periods in which sexuality is more sharply contested and more overtly politicized. In such periods, the domain of erotic life is, in effect, renegotiated."

Gayle S. Rubin's "Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality" (1984)

South Korea is now in the period of sexual renegotation. Diverse sexual identities are only now beginning to take form through dialogue, instigated often in the heat of moral crusades against sexual deviance and sex crimes. These newly emerging identities are also premised on erroneous notions of heterosexual normativity, and in recent academic works in the country the question of the relationships between sexual acts, sexual orientation, and sexual identity have often gone unanswered or even bypassed altogether. Instead of starting from the basics, probing out the intricacies and getting one's hands dirty with the naked truth in Mead, Kinsey, Klein, or even Freud-style, academics have often taken the Western sexuality rubric as universal—simultaneously bypassing concepts of private-versus-public, differences in conceptual views of masculinity and femininity (and whether such concepts even exist), and ultimately disregard the *sui generis* of their 'subjects' and the limitations of the adopted categorizations. Few, if any, have ventured into the meaning of sex in countries in East Asia, and none have taken a step away from the hetero/homosexual divide that is currently reproducing discrimination betwixt and between sexual identities in places like the US. There is a piercing irony when Gayle S. Rubin laments that "In Western culture, sex is taken all too seriously," while positing that "if sex is taken too seriously, sexual persecution is not taken seriously enough. There is systematic mistreatment of individuals and communities on the basis of erotic taste or behavior," for in East Asia sex is removed from the equation altogether and persecution is taken as the norm (Rubin: 35). One is left wondering why a person of rational and sound mind would even choose to politicize or socialize his or her sexual identity in a country that lacks a word for the dirty act. Why be X, when you could just be you? What do these sexual identities really entail? And what, if anything, do they have to do with sex?

Instead of addressing the questions above, however, the overwhelming tendency in sexuality studies in the country has been to substantiate gender, sexualities, sexual orientations, and sexual identities by interpreting them as inextricable tools linked to politics—totally devoid of sex and sexual behavior. Yet whether such categorical fixtures exist in their own right within a community or whether their manifestation or creation are part and parcel of global necessity is paramount to any attempt at thinking about sexuality, sex, and sexual identity.

The dearth of gender research focusing on the connection between sex and sexuality has led to a growing political divide marked not by queer—including its various sexual cognates—but rather one beset by an overtly politicized pole between the undefined "homosexual" and "gay" and

the over-generalized heterosexual. This research plans to take a momentary pause from the gay-straight political polemic and focus on an arguably nascent sexual identity currently forming in the country.

There currently have been no attempts, written in Korean or otherwise, to understand sexual identities and their formation through the analysis of bi-curious or bisexual, sexually active individuals in South Korea, who are either self-identified or non-identified.[3] As a result, there have also been no attempts to address the implications of change sexual identity in South Korea from the views of arguably its most reflexive members. Why would anyone adopt a bisexual identity when there appears to be no political significance in the country? What social factors have led to or deterred the development of bisexuality as a social identity in the country? And, how is bisexuality interpreted in South Korea in terms of both sexual behavior and sexual identity?

Back to the Basics:

Sexual evolutionists and the hermeneutic sexologists adequately address the ingredients pertinent to determining both the factors constituting sexuality and its significance in Western societies, I would argue that the recipe may not be the same for countries that have experienced different historical and cultural trends. In the case of South Korea, rapid growth both economically and academically, led to marked differences in how society interprets sex, sexuality, or the lack thereof. Instead, I would argue that in South Korea rapid development and the need to appear cosmopolitan to keep up with the fast pace of global trends has led to a general tendency to become invested in issues that may not necessarily materialize from within, a state that I have termed reflexive cosmopolitanism.[4]

In particular, the findings in this research will show that the absence of the institutionalization of sexuality can lead not only to vast social disparities in defining sex and sexual behaviors, but also unveil differences regarding the distinctions between private/ public and masculinity/ femininity that make it dangerous to haphazardly apply the Western rubric of sexual identities to countries like South Korea. In particular, by specifically focusing on the case of bisexuals and bisexuality, this research will not only show the need for a more nuanced discussion of sexuality beyond Western-centric ideal types in East Asia, but also provide evidence of the effects of adopting Western sexualities indiscriminately in countries like South Korea.

Research Methodology

My intentions should be clear from the outset. First, bisexuality exists, though not necessarily in any specific universal, non-static, or ubiquitous form. In addition, though the general tendency is to generalize bisexuality as the center ground, equidistance between two bipolar relationships in which the bisexual is attracted to both males and females, the term itself is much more complex.

Second, by focusing on South Korea, I intend to argue that sexual identities are not universal and rather the results of a process of mitigation that can be analyzed in a social and cultural context. This is nothing new. However, probing beyond concepts of identity and venturing into the complexity of meaning, especially related to sex, is yet unchartered territory in South Korea. It is my belief that the lack of dialogue about sex in general and bisexuality in particular makes the country a perfect place for investigating sexuality and can greatly add to the discursive production of the sexual self, not only in Korea, but also in terms of the relationship between sexual identity and sex-related discourse in gender studies. In a place in which sexual acts are only now developing the linguistic necessities for becoming self-developed norms, South Korea is also arguably the bedrock from which to study the epistemological and ontological divides between sex, sexuality, and sexual identity.

Third, while specifically focusing on South Korea, I will delve into a critical discussion of sexual identity, but this discussion will not attempt to draw an evolutionary progression of the identity, which often serves as reasoning for feminist and gay writings in the country. My reasoning is two-fold. Primarily, that there is no such social-driven reactionary manifestation of bisexuality in South Korea, and also that bisexuality as an entity is neither a sexual object choice, a gendered subject, nor a pre-disposed identity that can be explained away with 'I was born that way'.

Fourth, my use of interviews should also make clear that I intend to argue that conscious and unconscious behavior do not necessarily constitute the sexual identities and genders that people readily admit. An analytical linkage between cultural values & self in relation to sex in part constitutes the renegotiation process of identity that is catalyzed and mitigated by Other. The interviews conducted serve as a means of "othering," which facilitates the process of creating meaning that had either been obscure, dormant, or entirely unknown to the subject. This othering furthers the reflexivity of renegotiating self by the subject, additionally providing confidence in that their answers are to a readily identifiable outsider, namely me, a non-Korean. However, in this case, the subject is forced either to mitigate between cultural values and notions of sexual norms or to predicate his understanding of self on the reflexive binary theme of Korean versus non-Korean expectations.

Fifth, I would like to reiterate Blumstein and Schwartz's 1997 warning of viewing any data on sexual minorities—regardless of how large the sample pool—in terms of random sampling. For despite, how heterogeneous or diverse the respondents, "...when dealing with underground populations or sexual minorities...they are certainly not representative of anything but themselves." It is thus my intention to present data, similar to Blumstein and Schwartz's work, that only shows patterns that occur with enough regularity to warrant interpretation. The overall goal is two-fold: to find patterns in the environmental factors giving way to bisexual behavior as well as to scope the meaning, or lack thereof, of bisexuality as an identity in South Korea. Patterns

were discerned based on topic and word-based frequency of usage, duration spent on the topic, clearly expressed emotional concern regarding the topic, and repetitiveness of topic-to-topic linkages.

Lastly, this study was intended to be introspective for those who were interviewed. While a person's views of sexuality are often associated with abstract notions of sex and pleasure, interviews stimulate concrete constructions people place on their own feelings and experiences, which both provide contextual substance for how they internalize their feelings and actions, while also providing for the cultural logic of how & why they employ certain linguistic means of doing so. This research attempts to take such accounts verbatim in hope of finding patterned responses that help to understand in what ways a newly budding sexual identity is forming in the country.

Though this research agrees with Blumstein & Schwartz's 1997 warning that interviews with sexual minorities cannot serve as a sample pool of society, it will attempt to find patterns in responses of sexuality-based groups living in Korea. On this basis, it used 3 groups of 5 volunteers who are self-identified gay/ homosexual, heterosexual, and bisexual males (while respecting that some were undecided, combined, or still in transition). It also used these 15 participants to understand the meaning and significance of bisexuality as well as a way of analyzing pre-self-identification particularly of those who were undecided, combined, or still in transition.

Issue-based Sexual Identity Awareness

Though eroticism can be found in Korean tradition art and literature, anything remotely similar to homosexual or bisexual behavior are few and far between. Gahyun Youn (1996) provides the earliest known account of anything similar to Western concepts of unorthodox sexuality that date back to April 780 when Hyekong (765-580), the 36th king of the Shilla Dynasty was killed by his subordinates because they could not accept his femininity. A more direct example of possible same-sex eroticism dates back to Myojung (785-798), a Buddhist famous for his beauty and rumored to have been sought after by several male aristocrats and even by the Emperor of the Tang Dynasty. But the most revealing of non-heterosexual behavior in Korea's history was that of Gongmin (1330-1374) whose reign began in 1352. His tendency for pederasty after the death of his wife led him to establishing an apprentice association that is well documented in historical texts. The tales of the king's same-sex tendencies were also depicted in a controversial 2008 motion picture, *A Frozen Flower* (Ssanghuajeum).

Regardless of the above findings, there are no documented sources of same-sex sexual acts or historical writings that acknowledge the existence of a non-heterosexual identity, despite the existence of sex between men. Gahyun Youn asserts that "...in the tradition of Korean folklore, there are many [oral] stories about anal intercourse between men." In addition, Young-gwan Kim et. al. (2006) presents a prominent case of same-sex sexual relations that led to seemingly identity altering effects within the community of *hwarang* monks who were even said to have practiced

transvestitism. Yet, few works can be found in pre-modern Korea that presents direct evidence of non-heterosexual relations tied specifically to identity.

It was not until many centuries later that the latent discourse on non-heterosexual sexual identities came to the academic foreground in the country. Though many attribute this unveiling of hidden sexual enclaves to the coming outs of two celebrities in the country, the reality is that the South Korea government and media have often followed US media and contemporary trends when it comes to addressing non-heterosexual issues. As such, no identity-driven factors on the social level exist for addressing male sexual orientation in South Korea. Instead, the foci on sexual identity have come (and often dissipated just as quickly) in short scholastic & media-driven bursts that are highly dependent on social structure and issue-specificity. These issues, dating particularly from the 1990s, are (1) AIDS, (2) democratization, human rights, discrimination, & military conscription (3) sex crimes, and (4) marriages of convenience. It is also my view that each of these areas has consequently led to the blurring of sexual identities by (sometimes inconsistent & inappropriately) coupling sexual orientation with issue specificity.

-(1) AIDS

The fear of AIDs and the view that it was a disease spread by same-sex relationships were realities in the 1980s. While hosting the 1988 Olympics, the fast growing epidemic overseas presented South Korea with a dilemma, namely how to address it. The country chose to deal with it as a national security issue rather than as an individual health-related one that is also important domestically. This resulted in a "...dichotomy between foreign dangers and the Korean self [which] became manifest in the HIV/AIDS prevention discourse."

The result was clearly an ill-conceived preventive measure because statistics showed that by 1993 infection via contact with nationals (44.7%) had rapidly surpassed that of foreigners (43.3%) in the country. These startling statistics led to blaming the rapid increase in infection on what were deemed a virulent domestic homosexual community and the product of the prostitution industry. The media reported that the illness was one "...constituted largely of cases of homosexuals contracting AIDS from foreign partners and infection from prostitutes." In addition, it was only two months later that the government launched a full-scale attack on its homosexual minorities. In 1990, the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs released a report of 269 male homosexuals and warned that homosexuality could lead to a sharp rise in the number of AIDS patients. This move to blame disadvantaged women and a growing sexual minority did not stop at the governmental level. NGOs also joined in, leading to a powerful purity campaign that demonized sexual deviance of all natures.

The Korean Anti-AIDS Federation (KAAFS), which focused primarily on educating and assisting youth in the country, set out on an education-driven campaign in 1995 to morally purify middle and high school students. As the only such organizations in the country at the time, it benefited from both a media presence as well as a large backing in terms of social contributions.

However, besides promoting sex within familial ideals, reproductive responsibilities, moral obligations, and nationalistic commitment, the organization also deemed sex and even expressions of sexuality as deviant behavior that would invariably lead to the possibility of contracting HIV/ AIDS. As can be imagined, a general atmosphere of self-inflicted sexual repression in the minds of youth resulted—replaced by a culture in which talk of sex or eroticism was made foreign, intensely connected to impure nationalist ideals, and dangerously close to life-threatening infection.

-(2) Democratization, Human Rights, Discrimination, & Military Conscription

Korea is the only divided nation in the world, and its southern half has one of the longest mandatory conscription services (from 21 to 36 months commiserate on service time) in which every healthy male must join. All men from ages 21 to 30 must perform active military service, unless they fall under the provisions of Articles 26-43 of the Military Service Act and are defined as those who "...have physical or mental deficiencies, special family circumstances, or skill in a special or unusual profession." According to 2011 South Korean Military Manpower Administration military statistics, 74.3% of all new cadets were between the ages of 20 and 22. And of all the new candidates, 79.8% had matriculated into college. The combination of age and mandatory conscription, not to mention the stress of college life, make for an explosive sexual mix. In addition, media attention to the global democratic trends of the late-20th century, such as sexual orientations and identities, has led to several scholarly works that focus on heterosexual behavior, homosexual sexual identity, and the influences of military enlistment.

Yeong Jin Choi et. al. (2000), in studying the effects of military service on masturbation habits of young cadets (N=1,212), found that there was a high correlation between military service and both the incidents of masturbation (98.1%) and coitus with prostitutes (67.7%) in South Korea—substantially higher than the 60-85% for other countries. They concluded that most of their subjects had "...not learned about sexuality from formal education offered in schools or from parents." They also found that 1.07% of their sample pool were engaged in homosexual activities. However, there is no further analysis of the relatively large percentage of homosexual activity taking place in an all-male military where same-sex relations are strictly forbidden. But the report does raise the issue that perhaps sexual education and the lack of sexual awareness has led some to see the military as a place for experimentation.

In another case, Insook Kwon of the Korea Institute at Harvard University (2010) speaking specifically in regard to feminists' general lack of attention toward male conscription, argues that culture has led to "...a triad of untouchable assumptions." Namely, she posits that women believe conscription is a man's concern, that Confucianism combined with industrialization is explanation enough of gender oppression, and that South Korea's conscription is "a crucial norm for constructing 'normal,' 'adult' masculinity." Yet, culturally constructed presumptions in South Korea are so prevalent that often there is general disregard for the

complexity of masculinity itself— a matter that is generally regarded as universally equivalent. It is this disregard that I argue has moved avoiding the issue of male queer identities and sexual orientations to ignoring them altogether in feminist and gay studies in the country.

There have been a marked rise in studies related to homosexuals and especially in response to military and human rights, however they are nearly all premised within minority/ majority, gender equality, sexual violence, and 'gay liberation' paradigms without being fully engaged in determining the meaning of male sexual identity and sexual orientation of those homosexuals in South Korea. The truth of the matter is that while feminism and gender studies in South Korea have surged, queer studies have not.

Additionally, issues related to avoiding the draft through conscientious objection have led to many articles and essays on human rights and the fight against male sexual oppression. Suicide cases within the military, such as the recent case of a 24-year-old army officer who, after having been ignored by his superiors, hung himself from worries of his gay identity, have further fueled the gay community's outrage as well as led to a general awareness of the need to address male sexual identity and orientation issues more directly.

Regardless of the headway that has been made in considering gays in the military, no research has been done with consideration that these "gays" could be bisexuals. Clearly, without such consideration the impact of the findings is in question. For example, legislation that claims to allow gays a specialized choice in how or whether they enlist in the military would invariably lead to problematic outcomes for the sheer reason that what constitutes "gay" in the South Korean gay community may not simply come down to questions of sexual essentialism or of where one puts his penis.

-(3) Sex Crimes

Another area in which media has led to attention on male sexual identity and perhaps even in regard to sexual orientation is sex-related crimes and violence in South Korea. For reasons explained above, sex crimes such as prostitution and rape have posed serious problems in South Korea and have led to a superabundance of works attempting to address, understand, and solve these problems. There is a genuine concern to understand male sexual behavior and male sexual thinking, but not necessarily on how they connect to their identities.

Gwan Kim Hyun Young et. al. (2011) compiled a comprehensive survey of essays that focus particularly on the concept of male sexuality in Korea. Yet, interestingly enough not one article addresses masculinity in gay men (though Han Chae Yoon's "Lesbian's Masculity: Gendered Coexistence, Reversal, Battle, Conflict" provides an interesting U.S.-driven approach to explaining the lesbian masculinity or what she affectionately labels "the butch"). The closest consideration of a male queer identity and masculinity would be Young Jeong Na's "From the Boundaries of Male/ Unmale: Masculinity of Male's with Sex Changes," which unfortunately posits a morose under appreciation of gendering between the sexes.

The new concern on masculinity is indirectly a result of the realization in the country of the role gender plays in social crime, however a more direct crime-related factor for our purposes is the manifestation of gay-targeted hate crimes in the country.

From gay-targeted cons to illegal gay saunas to sexual molestation by AIDs inflicted homosexuals to crimes that particularly focus on male sexual orientation, it is clear that South Korea has now reached a precipice in which understanding the intricate interplay between male sexual identity and sexual orientation is essential.

-(4) Marriages of Convenience

The last case in which we see a new vector of both academia and social change in terms of queer-related studies and South Korea is the formation of 'contract marriages' between gays and lesbians. John (Song Pae) Cho (2009) in "The Wedding Banquet Revisited: 'Contract Marriages' Between Korean Gays and Lesbians" finds that in conforming to family values, gays and lesbians re-inscribe and conform to heteronormative values. He shows that in South Korea "...gays and lesbians marry heterosexual partners without revealing their sexual orientation, in order to 'pass' as straight." This interview-based research provides a significant cultural understanding of how gays and lesbians adjust and adapt to deal with the social constraints that they must bear. Yet what is of note is that while attempting to emphasize the "discursivity of sexual and gender norms," he binds his research within a hetero-homonormative paradigm. He does not venture into questioning whether beyond emotional attachment, a queer subject could also feel a physical/ emotional attraction or identify as a bisexual in such contractual relationships. This is regretful especially considering the impact it could have on the view of marriage and sexual identity. Because South Korea does not have a period of a media-driven bisexual appeal that the US enjoyed in the 1970s, it is my contention that the formation—not origin—of this identity is currently driven by internal mechanisms and dynamics of sexuality.

The Meaning of "Sex" and the Problem of Sexual Identity

South Korea presents an interesting etymological case in which non-Korean words are often adopted from other languages and take on prescribed meanings for the articulation of sexual identities and even acts. For example, there is no pure Korean word that translates directly as sexual intercourse. The words used for the sexual act are *seonggyou* (성교), a word adopted from the Chinese *xìngjiāo* (性交), and *sekse* (섹스) the English phonetic rendering of the word sex. Unlike other words adopted into the language that are used to articulate non-native ideas, actions, and the like, sex intercourse is one idea and act that is not foreign to South Korea or to any other

country. Why then the absence of a pure Korean term and the adoption of a Western/ non-Korean starting from the 20th century? And how, if at all, does this influence the act itself?

Prior to the early 1990s, the country had no personal pronouns for "he" or "she" in the language—a single third-person pronoun was used for both genders. The change is purportedly the results of globalization and the subsequent need for translations—an adoption whose usage has become commonplace, and one that has made women more visible in academia and in the Korean language. Would this apply similarly to sex? Has sex become a Foucaultian subject of discourse that simply needs ways to articulate itself? Perhaps. But one thing is certain: not only is sex considered taboo, it remains external rather than intrinsic to society. As such, it is not wonder that a void has formed between the meaning of sexual intercourse & sexual identities and the terms adopted to articulate pre-existing sexual behavior.

Though sex is a term adopted from the West, the boundaries of its meaning are obscure in South Korea, and these boundaries often extend beyond Western notions of public and private sexual life. Instead, the adoption of the term "sex" in Korea is mismatched with that of the West, for in the latter what "...counts as sexual has been constructed in terms of gender hierarchy." And this gender-based assessment almost always includes sexual genitalia and beliefs regarding femininity and masculinity. However, the truth is that human desires and practices are discursively constituted. For this reason, it is hard to locate South Korea's interpretation of sex within this discourse especially when it comes to how the country determines what is sexual and what is not—primarily because there is seldom any discourse for or about it. Thus an investigation into how sexual behavior and identity in South Korea combine is paramount in the country.

While Western notions of sex and sexual acts, for example, are particularly rooted in the conceptual fragility of heterosexuality, no such base exists in the case of South Korea. Penelope (1993), for example, pointed out that "heterosexuality qualifies only as a prefabricated way of living that one slips into anonymously...Remove the social institutions which support it, and the whole fragile edifice will collapse."As a result heterosexuality requires strict behavioral codification.

What comes to the fore here is that South Korea has developed its own developmental and institutionalized construct of heterosexuality as an identity that is nearly devoid of codification, but one that has arisen from the necessity of considering non-heterosexual identities.

Though some could argue that in terms of identity politics such distinctions do not matter, that the binary of heterosexual and homosexual exists in both the West and in South Korea and are often framed within this political context, and to a certain extent they would be correct. However, where this difference does matter is in complex realities of behavior that has been appropriated to these sexual identities. Namely, a gay in the West is not necessarily a *gei* (to adopt the Korean phonetic for the term) in South Korea and such distinctions must be considered in understanding the meaning of sex and its connection with sexuality.

This difference in the meaning of sex, sexual orientation, and particularly how such concepts link to sexual identities is in part due to the stereotypes of what is considered masculinity or femininity in South Korea and whether such distinctions matter when it comes to sexual intimacy.

> Like I said, I'm not so sure if that would mean they're bisexual….simply because they really do need someone confide their feelings in. But that seems to be something necessary in the Army. (So a matter of masculinity?) Maybe it starts that way, but sex is the main reason. [H4][5]

> For me, it's really not possible to tell the difference between a gay and a straight guy in South Korea. We don't act so strong like they show guys on TV. I guess we probably all look bisexual. (How does a bisexual look?) I guess they would be….like…a mixture between like a man and like a woman, right? [H5]

As stated above, the meaning of masculinity—the codified behavior so essential to maintaining the fragile nature of heterosexual behavior in Western countries like the US—plays a much weaker role when it comes to South Korea. When formulating opinions related to how homosexuals, heterosexuals, and bisexuals act, most respondents claimed that homosexuals were more feminine than heterosexuals, while bisexuals were both feminine and masculine. Yet, when asked what the meaning of these sexual identities were, every respondent focused more on internal traits than on external appearances or on the presumed sexual behaviors of the sexualities in question.

The consideration of bisexuality made it difficult to rely heavily on stereotypes that have often served as means of differentiating lifestyle traits. Stereotypes rooted in US-based queer society such as the myth of a pink economy, i.e. that every self-proclaimed gay is affluent and interested in high-end brand names and expensive make-up, for example, are not markers of masculinity or femininity in South Korea. As a result, differentiating the ascribed identities from the external characteristics often leads to varied answers when it comes to describing bisexuals and bisexuality—which, as a result, often leads to heterosexuals and homosexuals relying solely on internal attributes when defining a bisexual.

The Meaning of Sex Behavior & Sexual Identity

"Sex and Space cannot be 'decoupled.'" Johnston and Longhurst's (2010) recent book on eroticized topographies, *Space, Place, and Sex* detailed the contrasting role of sexual behavior from the perspective of homosexuals and bisexuals in contrast to those of heterosexuals. And although I set out to avoid polemicizing the issue of bisexuality, this

difference is in part the result of the prevailing standards in the meaning of sex—a standard that is arguably based less on Western morality or sexual essentialism than on personal rationalizations of what accounts for sexual versus non-sexual expressions of intimacy.

Perhaps the most interesting case in which heterosexual identity is not decoupled by sexual behavior was that of H2 below, who found difficulty in placing why he has had frequent sexual encounters with men but insists that such interactions do not negate his heterosexual identity. When asked whether he enjoyed the sexual activities he has had with men, he quickly affirmed. However, he had difficulties in explaining why he felt that it was not part of his sexual identity.

> Uh....what I wanted....one time....just...well...having become so close...like...uh...but like...I want to have sex....that kind of feeling was totally absent...just like...with him...just...I wanted to be closer, it was just kind of like that feeling. [H2]

Nothing definitive can be said of this particular statement, but when notions of relationship fulfillment or sexual intimacy become issues, as a self-professed heterosexual, it seems necessary to renegotiate sexual identity and reinterpret how sexual behavior connects to it. When asked the meaning of sex and particularly what sex means, there was a tendency even amongst all of the heterosexuals to see sex as a "joke" or a "fun" activity that was seen as separate from identity—behavior void of pre-desire or fantasy. As such, they often referred to their actions as "play."

In addition, the boundaries of what constitute sex seemed to play major roles in how the respondents determined their sexual identities. When asked what sex means to them, and whether they believed that kissing, touching one another's genitals, mutual (non-contact) masturbation, or fellatio would constitute as sex, they all seemed to have very different views. And based on these views, there is a clear tendency to negotiate the significance or presence of feelings of sexual intimacy.

For example, during the interview with H2, the interviewee initially describes his experiences in terms of intimacy. During the discussion he provides two separate explanations of his sexual behavior. The first is the claim that alcohol made him do it, which he later retracts as his main reason for his repeated same-sex sexual acts. The second appears connected to the idea of sexual deviance as a means of having fun. What is of note is that he begins by focusing specifically on the relationship that he shares with his partner. He internalizes his behavior during the discussion from matters of intimacy to conditional bisexuality to sexual deviance, and finally to one devoid of amorous feelings

(negating his original premise of intimacy). Oral sex and intercourse have little or nothing to do with love for him—a thought that is not entirely uncommon even in the West. His same-sex behaviors are not fueled by sexual desire, so the possibility of being a bisexual for him is impossible.

Some could claim that he is in denial. However, this would unfairly subject his identity choice to the mistaken assumption that sexual identities are in fact culturally universal, while also deny him agency. Throughout the interview, H2 asserted that his idea of sex must include anal or vaginal *insertion* with the penis—not simply an erotic act that includes the penis.

In another case, it became clear that the boundaries of sex are not necessarily merely those created by the presence or absence of erotic penile stimulation. The third heterosexual, for example, explains that his childhood play included mutual masturbation with friends. In his interview, he explains that not only is mutual masturbation normal amongst boys, but also states that it takes two person's in a state of passion *for one another* to conclude that any behavior is of a sexual nature. H3's interview brings to light the significance and necessity of considering culture when differentiating private from public, especially when it comes to defining a sexual act. Not doing so, brings meaning to Terrie Goldie's observations that there is a tendency of seeing Western—namely American—constructs of sexuality as universal:

> 'Postcolonial' is now a body of literature in the American academy, replacing a quite minor category called 'Third World'. As this homology has spread, like so many Americanisms spread, there is no room left for any cultures which might be post-colonial but are not 'third world', 'developing', or whatever is the latest euphemism for the poor and racially other (in the perception of the west).

In this short exchange with H3 above, the meaning of sex and sexual acts differs starkly from Western interpretations of a sexual acts as any that include the combination of arousal and genitalia. In the case of South Korea, sexual acts are not always defined by one's sexual organs, orgasm, or even in terms of the sexual orientation of the participants. Yet, for this respondent gender, i.e. the presence of the opposite sex, would automatically constitute the same behavior as a sexual act. This exchange is especially interesting when one considers non-heterosexual male orientations and the meaning of sex. According to H3, in this case, a sexual act requires the subjective internalization of the situation and context of which the act was done, which does not necessarily require the perceptions or consideration of the individuals or parties involved. This begs the question of what such

acts mean in the presence of queers who may or may not be readily identifiable by gendered attributes alone.

Even for our self-proclaimed conservative heterosexual participant, H4, the question of what constitutes a sexual act, led to problems in terms of the boundaries and significance of behavior and whether those behaviors could be considered sexual.

This difficulty in defining the meaning of sex is not limited to sexual extremes such as whether oral sex between men would constitute a sex act or not. Kissing or pecking with the lips on the cheek presents some difficulties in interpreting the meaning of the act as well. Finding reason between the extremes, one bisexual, B3, seemed to link H2's Cartesian split to the importance of his sexual desires—neither of which fit the typical model of bisexual interpretation that came out of the other interviews related to direct interpretation of bisexuality in his answer to the meaning of sexual intercourse?

> With sexual intercourse generally people think that it's something between and man and a woman, when a man and a woman are in love. The process of sharing love when in love. It seems this is what is often said...but I think it may be like that but not necessarily so. [B3]

What does this confusion tell us? For one, it seems safe to say that for our participants the meaning and significance of a sexual act differs from those of Western interpretations, which are primarily based on biological, moral, and sexual essentialists prescripts. And second, it leads to a need to question the foundations upon which queer sexualities form and matter in the case of South Korea.

The definition of sex is essential in understanding bisexuality primarily because heterosexuals see sex (regardless of their personal interpretations of it) as matters of behavior and desire, whereas bisexuals and homosexuals see it as specifically tied to ones emotional-driven relationships and need for intimacy (which may not necessarily include sex). As a result, many of the respondents who asserted their sexual-oriented gay exclusivity did not feel the need to reinvent themselves despite their opposite-sex relations. Essentially they admitted that sexual intimacy or relationship fulfillment was absent in such relationships—or vice-versa depending on which they value most in terms of their sexual identity. Their reasoning is that sex is less important in overall sexual identity.

In addition, heterosexuals who also admit to having sexual relations with other men feel that they are not bisexuals because these heterosexuals believe that sexual desire is most important when it comes to one's sexual self and / or selves. For them, even though the sex may be "fun," without the pointed sexual pre-desire or fantasies to engage

in it, i.e. if it is bi-situational, it does not constitute a bisexual identity. Moreover, according to the heterosexuals involved what even constitutes a sexual act has everything to do with the actor and nothing at all to do with the receiver/ viewer of that act, thus making mutual masturbation a plutonic action that can take place with other men present and without a sexual connotation in and of itself.

The Formation of Bisexuality and Its Meaning

"The professionalization of gayness requires a certain performance and production of a 'self' which is the constituted effect of a discourse that nevertheless claims to 'represent' that self as a prior truth."
-Judith Butler, 1989.

Should sexual identity reflect sexual behavior? Are bisexuals simply pansexuals who should be devoid of any political power as a minority group in South Korea? And what are the performative ascriptions (if any) that lead way to a bisexual identity in the country? In other words, what is a bisexual in the country?

Self-realization of Behavioral Negation

What was found from the respondents was that bisexuality could play a role in the renegotiation of sexual identities in some respondents, while a exclusive behavioral descriptive for others. As such, for most who identified as homosexuals, bisexuality served less as a means of interpreting sexual behavior as it did for sexual-oriented relationship fulfillment, while for bisexuals sexual intimacy and relationship fulfillment mattered more.

> Before...I used to think this way before having a relationship with a man...even before having sex with a man...of course that's the way it is with society's prejudice. Even though I wanted to hook up with a girl, I didn't really want to have sex but if it happened it would likely be because I'd want a child...that is, after marriage. And I just think I enjoy having sex with guys I guess. [B1]

When asked why he had switched his sexual identification, the respondent insinuated that relationship fulfillment had played a major part. To him, relationship roles—perhaps even at the gendered level are important in terms of how one identifies himself sexually.

> From that time I thought about it. But that time...the reason was at that time I was seeing a guy...so I had a person I was going out with...therefore, because I

> want to go out with a guy and I want to go out with a girl I think I'm bisexual. [B1]

Though he had initially considered himself gay, he felt it necessary to reassess his sexuality mid-interview, particularly after bisexuality was mentioned. In doing so, he made a clear distinction between the types of relationships that he had had with men and the ones he had had with women. He went further to explain that his reconsideration was because he felt that the term 'gay' referred to homosexual exclusivity.

> The meaning of gay...I...gay looking from the point of sexuality means liking a guy....not liking a woman. (A guy liking a guy?) Right. And I have an older male friend who's just like that. He can't even stomach the idea of having intercourse with a girl. "For me the thought even makes me sick," he'd say. I think that kind of person is truly a gay…To be honest, I can't be certain as for me. This is because sleeping with a girl...having sex with a girl...I don't enjoy it. [B1]

In some ways, the problem of understanding the connection between sexual identity and behavior in South Korea comes down to the meaning of love, sex, and relationships. For B1, social precursors account for his living a bisexual life (as opposed to a double or even fluid one) in which he finds both men and women sources for fulfilling different, yet complementary needs. However, he revealed a social stigma that he feels is a factor of his bisexual identity.

> Sure {there are some shortcomings to being bisexual}. What I've been saying up until now...if you look at it as a whole...no matter how you look at it the shortcoming would have to be that society is not aware enough. I never really considered exactly where that shortcoming lies, but that's definitely the right term for it. Not a weakness, a shortcoming, I think…for example, ever since I was a freshman that's been one stress...because in our country heterosexual is the norm. That itself is thought to be so natural... "why don't you have a girlfriend?" and naturally, "Why's that" in this way...always pressing why you don't have a girlfriend...the culture is one that's always pushing and giving you stress like you have to make one. So "he has no girlfriend, what a weirdo. He's not normal." Because people look at you like this...for me I felt such an inferiority complex and it totally stressed me out. [B1]

This stress, the need to deal with others' perceptions that if one is not a homosexual then one must certainly be a heterosexual often causes bisexuals to lead somewhat masked existences, causing them to live performative heterosexual lives—lives that may not even help with reducing or combating stress.

> More than easing the stress, I often try to change the way people around me think. I'd say "Hey, when there's a girl that it's going so well with." I always use this Korean style of creating a cover. Let's just say that I'd say that I have a girlfriend. In this way, probably kids would spread the rumor directly. (Don't you feel that that could lying?) That's kind of how it is. But, umm...but usually I do like that person. I don't know if you can call it love, but I really do...like the girl. The girl too...but because I've never tried sex before so it's not that kind of like. If I do, well...I don't think that it will really get me going. [B3]

For the bisexuals included in this study, relationship fulfillment and even relationship labeling served as important factors in how the participants perceived their own sexuality. Rather than simply referring to the men with whom they had slept as sex objects, they were more prone to attach relationship titles to their sexual partners.

> Yes, in high school I had a boyfriend...the first guy that I had sex with. (And did you have a girlfriend at the time?) No. But that friend was kind of bisexual. Because he used to say that he was bisexual because when he was younger he had an experience with a girlfriend and...he didn't do her...they just kissed...that's all he said he did. [B1]

It is important to stress, that for this particular respondent as for the other bisexuals, affixing titles rather than simply relying on sexual behavior was important in assessing ones sexual identity.

The view that one's sexual identity is tied to intimacy and relationship fulfillment was further affirmed by men who identify as homosexuals or gay. However, such relationships and intimacies did not negate our homosexual respondents' views of their own sexualities. Take for example, G2, who had claimed to have sexual relationships with both men and women, but in the absence of intimacy with the latter. To the question of whether he had a boy or girlfriend, he responded that he had had a girlfriend but that she was oblivious to his having a boyfriend, and summarily added that his boyfriend however was privy to his having a girlfriend.

Regardless of the relationships he claimed to have had, and after having admitted that bisexuality exists, he posed the question of whether he himself was "totally gay" and answered by

stating that he didn't feel himself 100% gay. Instead, he claimed that intimacy and relationship fulfillment defined his sexual identification choice more than his sexual behavior.

In this case, as with the one preceding it, the production of male sexual identity is defined in terms of its relation to gender (i.e. whether one's partner is male or female)—an interpretation that goes beyond sexual behavior exclusive assessments, namely, the need for social companionship that can only be filled by a person of the opposite sex.

Most representative of the opposite extreme were the views of H2, the second heterosexual participant, who took sexual identity as intrinsically tied less to intimacy and relationship fulfillment than to sexual desire, stigmatized social necessity, and concepts of biological propensity.

> Um...to feel {bisexuality is} a sexual attraction to both men and women, no?" (Can you be a bit more specific?) Well. For gays, usually a person would feel horny when meaning a man. That person would want to have sexual relations with that man, I think. Just some kind of physical think you can say. But for a bisexual, in the same way when meeting a man they feel sexual attraction and when meeting a girl they feel the same kind of attraction. [H2]

Though he provides an analysis of bisexuality as a product of internal desire and attraction, when asked whether he had ever met a bisexual he immediately turns bisexuality into a homosexual tool or decoy stating that "…there are people who go out meeting girls to hide that they're gay." And when asked, if he believed such people are bisexual he said that he did not think so.

The inability to accept a bisexual identity as a true expression of one's sexual preference or orientation would seem to belittle bisexuality as something that is acquired, something that would not necessarily tie directly to one's biological propensity, which was mentioned above. However, that does not seem to be the case. Sexual orientation—not necessarily identity—is something that is likely an innate component of one's identity.

> Well, for me I think it's natural {to be a heterosexual}. (What about gays?) In terms of gays, isn't it also natural to them? I think that for gays liking men is also something they're born with. (And bisexuals?) Is bisexuality something someone is born with?..... I think it's something they're born with. [H2]

Significantly our respondent (H2) took a much longer time to consider bisexuality as a sexual orientation that could be from birth. This could be primarily caused by the need to negotiate a sexual identity, and to see it as a sexual orientation. However, what became clear in the

interviews is that when asked whether the non-bisexual respondents had ever met a bisexual, which requires taking sexual orientation to the sexual lifestyle level, most respondents automatically either answered in the negative or would reply that a bisexual would likely be "…a mixture between like a man and like a woman…". [H5]

Regardless of the vastly different impressions for what accounts for bisexuality, every respondent said that bisexuality exists in South Korea and also that it is a common sexual identity in the country. And while some regarded bisexuality as a consequence of sexual behavioral patterns, none of the respondents linked those same patterns with their own same and/ or opposite-sex relations. Additionally, amongst four of the heterosexual respondents, bisexuality could be perceived as a decoy—whereby a man would seek female companionship to hide his true gay identity.

> No. I've never met one {a bisexual}. However, a gay guy who...there are a few people who pretend to be bisexual. (Why do you think so?) There are gays hiding their identities by meeting girls and they become that way. (But why don't you think they could still be bisexual?) No, I don't think they are. [H3]

Aside from both affirming the existence of bisexuality as a possible sexual identity, the respondents also showed that there is a somewhat unclear delineation between the idea of whether identity is based on sexual behavior, sexual desire, intimacy, psychological relationship fulfillment, stigmatized social necessity, or biological propensity in South Korea. However, what is clear is that the heterosexual participants interpreted and admitted that bisexuality, at least on the outside, looks like a normalized decoy for closeted homosexuals (though they seldom referred to it outside of the sexual behavioral contexts).



[FIGURE 1: Interpretation of "bisexuality" according to heterosexuals, homosexuals, and bisexuals interview responses]

The above diagram shows the interpretation of bisexuality based on the participants interviewed. In the case of heterosexuals, emphasis was placed on sexual behavior and sexual desire as factors used to define bisexuality. However, sexual desire outweighed sexual behavior in their responses; the two in combination constituted bisexuality. In the case of self-identified homosexuals, bisexuality was primarily a matter of one's need for certain types of relationship fulfillments and sexual intimacy. In other words, bisexuality was a reflective identity that was in part caused by a person's relationships. However, these relationships would ultimately dictate one's sexual behavior according to the homosexuals & bisexuals interviewed, whereas it led to the construct of a decoy for hiding one's sexual orientation according to the heterosexuals who participated in the study.

Though these findings are far from conclusive, they do offer a suggestive understanding of how bisexuality is interpreted in South Korea based on the participants in this study. However, the effects of turning 20 seem to play more of a role in South Korean men's understanding of sex than either the effects of modernity or the evolutionary effects of sexuality in the country.

Sexuality, Society, and Turning 20

During the interviews, the respondents mentioned several social factors that they felt mattered most in how they came to realize their sexual identities (See Appendix A). When asked the question, "What do you believe is the connection of turning 20 and your sexual identity," each of the respondents mentioned the following: (1) consideration of military service after high school; (2) leaving the home; (3) the dynamics of alcohol consumption; (4) the influence of online pornography in early years; (5) marriage and social pressures to find an opposite-sex partner; (6) prostitution while in the military; and (6) family structure. A look at each of these factors is important to assessing the intricate interplay between socio-stigmitization, sexual behavior, and sexual identity.

In the case of the military, as mentioned above, all "healthy" men from the ages of 21 to 30 must serve the military service unless they fall under the provisions of Articles 26-43 of the Military Service Act as people who "...have physical or mental deficiencies, special family circumstances, or skilled in a special or unusual profession."[6] However, when that military service officially starts is a matter of individual choice and is often influenced by one's family, the latter of which is often fitting the bill for college tuition. This is not to be taken lightly, since according to 2010 statistics 77.6% of all high school males matriculate directly into college after graduation. And according to those interviewed, the military brings with it a substantial level of stress for all sexualities in South Korea.

For me…the military is extremely scary because I'm gay. I know I have to go and I know that I'll get beat up or in trouble…or ostracized…if I can't at least act straight. That's why I have a girlfriend. Like…preparation. [G5]

I think guys learn to….to well…learn how to act in the military. (Do they teach sex in the military?) No…they don't really teach sex. They sort of make you know that being gay is wrong….that a man should want a woman. The people around you make you feel that way. Always showing pictures or talking about girls they like who are famous. Even if you like a male actor…you somehow have to link him to how many girls he has…like you say…"he's attractive to girls," or "he's nice…" because he has to have so many girls. At least that's what I felt when I was there. [B4]

I went to the military and though I didn't have sex or anything with other guys, I couldn't help but look at them. I didn't care if they were girls or boys. I seriously just wanted to have sex with anything. I was sick of masturbating and wanted to share feelings with someone. [H3]

In addition, leaving the home also supplies many men with the freedom to pursue their personal sex lives. This has a two-fold effect. First, it presents a financial risk to maintain family ties that could be ruined if one's sexual preference is revealed as anything other than heterosexual. Such realities make the concept of family a legitimate financial incentive, causing one to see opposite sex relations as an asset based more on pragmatics than on personal preference per se. Second, leaving the home allows for sexual experimentation that may otherwise not have been possible within the home. The out-of-home sexual freedom could have a strong impact on sexual behavior and on sexual identity formation, and often financing this new freedom links sex and money worries.

I live with my mom and dad, but not when I'm in school. I like that because it gives me some space. I can do what I want. That includes meeting people. The problem is my place is…well…small. I feel embarrassed to bring people. I think of it as a sex room. My home is with my parents, which is in Busan. [G5]

I moved out when I got into college. I probably would live with my parents if they were closer to the school…they….well…to be honest….I had a girlfriend and I need a place to have sex. As a student it's too expensive to go to love motels every week….I don't have a job...so asked my parents to help me with a one-room. [H1]

The third factor, the dynamics of alcohol consumption affect sexual behavior that could factor into one's sexual preference and sexual identity. It has been found that alcohol can exert a causal effect on one or more of the constituent responses leading to genital arousal. As such, alcohol has a causal impact on sexuality indices studied in laboratory conditions. In essence, alcohol-stimulated behavior can lead to post-consumption sexual reactions and perceptions that could fundamentally change a person's view of sex as well as his sexual behavior. For college students in Korea, the likelihood that alcohol consumption will be a strong part of their college lives is high. According to the World Health Organization 1999 statistics, per capita consumption of alcohol in Japan was around 8 liters of pure alcohol per year, versus 9.4 for the USA, and 14.8 for South Korea, which accounts for the 13.1% of alcohol use disorders in men (cf. 2.25% and 5.45% in Japan and the US respectively). In addition, statistics show that 74% of persons between the ages of 20-29 drink in South Korea, while 96.4% of all male college students drink. In a more recent survey conducted in 2013, it was found that 71% (N=4,061) of college respondents admitted that they are binge drinkers (i.e. they had more than five shots of soju, Korean rice liquor, in one sitting). Drinking can play a major role in sexual identity formation and is an important aspect of college life in the country. In fact, all of the respondents claimed that alcohol could effect one's sexual behavior and for some it could even spell conditional sexual behavior that could cross the normal bounds of heterosexual behavior—a crossing that can be excused away with inebriation.

> I didn't think much of it. {receiving fellatio from a man}..it wasn't a big deal...but well let's say if...as I just explained...after drinking alcohol...not liking the guy...well...just...well....just....well...just...well...how about this....like that? Just thinking sort of like that. So, not thinking it's so deep. That act well...I'm not thinking oh I have to do this...it's just oh well I did this... without thinking so much about it. Like that. [H2]

For most, however, drinking seemed to play more of a role of reducing inhibitions while enhancing sexual pleasure and heightening risky sexual behavior.

Along with alcohol's inhibitory effects, exposure to online pornography at young ages has also been found to have an ideation creation effect on the meaning and relevance of sex and sexuality. Though the link between youth exposure to sexual media and sexual identity formation has hardly been approached, Jochen Peter (2008) using a sample of adolescents aged 13-20 (N=2,343) found that frequent exposure to sexually explicit Internet material correlated with greater sexual uncertainty and a positive attitude toward uncommitted sexual exploration (i.e. sexual relations with causal partners/ friends or one-night stands). These findings could factor into explaining sexual experimentation especially considering that Internet usage between 6 and 19 years old went from 15% in 1999 to 90.6% in 2002 in South Korea. This upsurge in Internet usage

along with the strong policing of the Internet (including a strong ban on all age unverified pornography) from 2008 are important in current 20-27 year-old sexual identity formation—especially amongst heterosexual males (See Appendix B). All of the respondents said that they had frequented pornographic sites when they were in middle school. What was interesting here is that their responses were to questions about their sex education. They all said that pornography was their sex education. They also made clear distinctions between this and education on pregnancy, contraceptives, and intercourse. The last of which did not take place in any classroom setting; the Internet played teacher instead.

As explained above, marriage and risk assessments are important reasons for explaining why a self-identified gay male might choose to have a relationship or even marry with a person of the opposite sex. In addition, with marriages of convenience, fulfilling familial notions of social responsibilities matter despite one's chosen sexual identity. However, a self-proclaimed gay man who chooses to have a relationship with the opposite sex might not necessarily nullify a possible sexual attraction to women and this needs further study and consideration. However, findings from this research prove that even self-proclaimed gay and straight men admit to both an attraction and need for amorous relations with the opposite sex. The financial difficulties of the late 90s presented by Cho (2009) above no longer seem to directly affect our respondents when it comes to their selecting a sexual identity, instead they all felt that family and personal preference mattered more.

> To be honest, I don't understand why a person would say they're gay or bisexual even if they are…all it does it destroy their family. Why can't they just have sex and stop talking about their sexual identity at all. It's just politics…just. [H5]

> You saw that movie right? It was call….yeah…No Regret…he was an orphan. I got mad when I saw that. Why make it like that? It was like saying it's a gay movie but also saying you should feel sorry for being gay...because of your family. Shit. [G3]

Another issue is the use of prostitution as a rite of passage for males conscripted into the army who have not had sexual relations with the opposite sex. Insook Kwon et. al. (2007) found that when asked the question "In the military, have you ever been forced to talk about sexual experiences, even when you did not want to?" 32.7% of their sample pool (N=667) responded affirmatively. This study, which focused on sexual violence among men in the military, uses this question as a means of establishing the likely starting point of sexual violence some men receive in the military. However, it also suggests that one's sexual experiences, especially in the military, are directly linked to one's manhood. A high correlation was found between rank and forced sexual activity, with military seniors often forcing their juniors to engage in sex with themselves

or with prostitutes (i.e. heterosexual sex). This could play a major role in sexual orientation ideation as well as in significantly influencing the development of sexual identities.

> In the army you've just got a bunch of men massed together. Well…sex…kissing…I can't really say, but there's a great deal of skinship that goes beyond the norm. (Can you be more specific in terms of what you mean by skinship?) Well…even if it's not that…even more than physical, there's the mental…like…there are cases like that. But me…well..we can't allow that….but the problem is that they have no place to fall on….no place to put their feelings. They become dependent. So as far as the emotion…if you can call it bisexual…probably I'm wrong, but well I'd think that would…hmmmm… [H4]

> I know that they like to force people to go have sex together. I don't want to sleep with a prostitute, but I think I would if they forced me. (How do you think they'd force you?) Oh you don't know the military here. They just force you. Like if you don't do it they will ignore you. You'll become ostracized. (So they bully you?) Yes. And so…if I had to then I would….but I'm not paying…ha ha. [G5]

One respondent even asserted that having sex with a prostitute does not necessary mean that he is not conservative. In his answer he even insinuates that it was the conservative attitude that made him do it.

> Yeah..how did the army come to frequent prostitutes? Hmm…I don't know if you know about this. You know that Koreans must go to the army, right? And I want to the Marines. And there it's really strict…the relationships are strong….especially the hierarchy. So I was only there for six months. And you only get exactly five days leave. And of course they call you. "Hey, where you at?" They say, "come here I'll pay." It's an extreme matter of dignity…of respecting superiority. [H4]

Finally, the family structure and particular the sibling sex ratio has been an interest since the 1930s and examined fairly extensively in sexual orientation studies. Blanchard (1998), for example, found that homosexual men have a higher number of older brothers, while Bogaert (2005) found that on average the weight of the evidence suggests that homosexual men have a higher sibling ratio than that of heterosexuals but was only significant in terms of the birth order effect. Clearly, this research does not focus on this factor and instead probes whether the same effects are similar to the case of South Korea. However, it should be noted that family structure

does play a possible role in sexual identity formation, though all of the respondents claimed that their family structures had little effect on their personal sexual identities.

> When I was young, my dad would often be at work. I lived with my two sisters, mom, and grandma. I was always with my sisters. They raised me like they were my mother, because my mom was so busy in the home. (So was it the reason for your choice?) It wasn't the reason of course, but now that I look back on it…more and more I think this is something from birth that can be influenced by family. [B3]

In addition to the above factors, there is exhaustive research detailing the strong correlations between sexual abuse and sexual orientation. However, persons whom have experienced sexual abuse were excluded from this research.

Bisexual Existentialism and Queer Studies

Throughout this paper I have emphasized the dangers of placing the formation of sexual identities in South Korea both within the interpretive position of a socially-driven manifestation following along the lines Western modernity as well as within a conceptual framework that they are universal or even cross-comparable. This is, however, the unfortunate trend with the current-day South Korean gay movement in the country. Despite the running mantra of others in opposition (Butler, 1990; Gopinath, 1996; Holton, 1998; Goldie, 1999; Hoad, 2000), the general tendency is to believe that modernizing trajectories abroad should and are forming in like ways domestically. Queer scholarship, as pointed out above, is a quickly growing field in South Korea—a field that does not always consider the domestic particularity of the surrounding trajectories. Is a *gei* really a gay? Or as Altman (1996) critically pointed out:

> The basic question in these developments suggest a fundamental change equivalent to the creation of powerful gay communities with economic, social, and political clout as in North America, Australasia and northern Europe. Is there, in other words, a universal gay identity linked to modernity? This is not to argue for the transhistoric or essentialist position...but rather to question the extent to which the forces of globalization...can be said to produce a common consciousness and identity based on homosexuality.

As can be ascertained from the above, the development of articulations of sexual identities may linguistically rely heavily on adoption of similar queer terminologies, however the factors that account for those identities are not universal. This nuance in meanings leads to problems of using Western methodologies to study and promote those identities. This is especially the case in which accepted umbrella ideologies such as human rights and nuanced identities such

as "gay" become issues that extend even transnationally, which could both pose a danger not only of South Korea's domestic integrity but also threatens to condense such identities into malformed, mismatched, and inappropriate ways.

It seems that while the US, which is a strong influence both in media and academia in the country, currently battles with deconstructing the hetero-homosexual dichotomy, South Korea is vigorously erecting it. Yet, while the dynamics of identity politics have taken root, the queer combatants are still in negotiation in terms of how to define themselves and in what ways these definitions will adequately account for addressing the social factors with which they must deal, including fulfilling traditional patriarchal duties, avoiding risks, asserting sexual individualism, acting as agents of identity, and so on.

The existence of bisexuals fundamentally changes both the meaning of *gei* in South Korea and creates a new need to re-assess studies regarding how discrimination against *geis* in particular in Korea is being handled. In particular, the rise of the anti-homophobia agenda not only leads to added pressures on self-identified bisexualities but also further marginalizes their existence in the queer sub-culture—an existence whose origins are neither exclusively exogenous nor indigenous to the country. And unfortunately, their existence is becoming more and more intrinsically tied to the hetero-homosexual paradigm—even though, as illustrated earlier, bisexuality in South Korea is not necessarily linked to either heterosexuality or homosexuality. Rather, bisexuality according to the study conducted here, is tied to relationship fulfillment and sexual intimacy, which may differ from the case of heterosexuality and homosexuality.

Taking the case of Indonesia and the universalization of the homosexual closet, for example, Boellstorff makes the following point that can also apply to the South Korean case:

> Lesbi [sic.] and gay Indonesians are open not to the whole universe but to the gay world; confessing to other worlds in society is irrelevant. We find not an epistemology of the closet but an epistemology of life world, where healthy subjectivity depends not on integrating diverse domains of life and have a united, unchanging identity in all situations but on separating domains of life, and maintaining their borders against the threat of gossip and discovery.

Yet, even in South Korea the meaning of diversity has taken root in the heterosexual world as a means through which dialogue and route imitation of Western mechanics alone can lead to fundamental change in the plight that queers face in the country. However, the means by which South Koreans conceptualize sex must be taken into consideration before rashly setting out on the belief that sexual performativity is in fact proof of the universalization of queer gendering. In the case of South Korea, the taboo on sex that is only beginning to lift played a large role in why the participants in this study had to resort to other outlets such as the Internet, SNS

applications, or even first-hand experimentation. This has made connecting the loosely defined sexual act with such important ideas as sexual orientation and sexual disease, and sex itself as external to a person's personality, orientation, and even agency.

What became clear during the interviews is that education of sex takes place in middle school, for *all* the participants—sex education is given at such a young age that it fails at teaching its importance in later years. Though sex education is now a part of many high schools even in 2009 there was much opposition from school administrators who saw the idea as creating sexual ideation in youth. However, several incidence of rape have made it a new item on the school agenda in terms of whether it should be taught in high schools. As a result, talk of sex and sex education has become fixed to dealing with issues of sexual empowerment and disempowerment, diatribes on how men should treat women with very little about the actual act of sexual intercourse.

The findings regarding the main source of sexual behavior education were common for all the participants. The first and often only source of learning about sex—rather than simply things related to sex—was through the Internet, often with friends, and in school or in one's own home. It was not an activity that was seen as something that should be done in private, *nor was* it done in private. Nearly all of the respondents admitted that porn was a group activity—not necessarily by choice—during their youth. One respondent (H3 above) claimed that most porn videos were in CD form and often required using a friend's or a public computer to watch. This ended up causing him to watch it with others, in which case they would often participate in sexual games. In fact, the mention of sexual education seemed to promote a deep-seated regret and anger in all the participants who complained that their sex education came at too young an age and also stressed social aspects of sex that played little role in their later lives.

The meaning of sex education is also important to consider when dealing with the issue of sexual identity. In this case, the effectiveness of that education is always a factor in understanding behavioral effects as well. What is most interesting about the response of this participant is the experience, which he explains he had at the time of which he was receiving his education that he says stressed protective sex and precautionary STD-related information:

Would you say that both receiving oral sex and giving oral sex are the same? Do you only choose one over the other? Receiving or giving?

> As for oral sex, both. But I guess I prefer to receive more than giving. Especially…is it ok if I be explicit? (Sure.) Swallowing sperm is something that I especially hate. When someone forces that it really pisses me off. This is what caused problems with the guy who was my first. He'd always pressure me to swallow and I hated it. [B3]

It is unclear from the response whether the respondent ever swallowed for sexual orientation-related factors or whether teachings on STDs were the reason for his refusal. However, though he admits to having had oral sex without a condom, he responded that he had never had unprotected sex.

Clearly, sex education in South Korea is still conservative in that education regarding sexual orientation or sexual identity remains largely absent from the classroom. In the 2012 debates for Ministry of Education, the current superintendent, when confronted with the issue of including sexual orientation in high school education to promote equality and human rights, responded with "In school saying that such things (homosexuality) are wrong and must be removed and even with the power to teach such things isn't right." However, there is no evidence, nor does this comment suggest, that education on sexual orientation will be added to the curriculum in South Korea. This added with the recent ban on several media outlets about sex serves as a harbinger of the difficulties youth will have in exploring sexuality while also promoting less conventional and perhaps even illegal methods of doing so.

It is also interesting to note that though there are many writings on the importance of family in South Korea, writings that usually emphasize the country's Confucian past, sex seems to fall outside the purview of the traditional family-oriented construct. Though only a small sample, the respondents all stated that they received all of their meaningful sex education from personal experimentation and with Internet and/ or technology-based resources; no one mentioned family as a source of any sex-related teachings.

What is additionally important is that queer studies should have some impact on society. However, due to this conservative nature of education many young South Koreans who are investigating their own sexualities are deprived of resources that could give a balanced view of the many sexual identities and orientation that they may be on the course of realizing. Writing particularly on the case of Western queer youth cultural, Susan Driver (2008) finds that "queer youth become intelligible through the details of what they say, how they do things…the point is not to ask 'who and what are queer youth' but rather to consider 'how do young people forge personal and collective representations that address their immediate conditions and elaborate enriching visions?'" This is a question that also affects the youth of South Korea and could play a large role in coming to a clearer understanding of how queer sexual identities are formed in the country. It could also help to better prepare and deal with discrimination and its formation, which brings us to reinterpreting and reassessing the properties that lead to minority inter-relational discrimination.

Bisexual v. Queer Discrimination--Revisited

The political gambit caused by the attention paid to sexual identity in South Korea is leading to an unnecessary marginalization of queer identities that does not nestle well within the

hetero-homosexual normative paradigm. However, more importantly a genuine appreciation of what constitutes the sexualities that truly make up this bipolar construct is essential to understanding the problems that all sexually marginalized agents face. Though queer studies are on the road to deconstructionism of monomythical sexual constructs, it is also necessary that the field consider its own deconstruction (i.e. promoting cross-sexuality studies) as a means of developing and understanding sexuality.

Perhaps what is most queer about queer studies is the overwhelming stabilization process that is created to maintain itself. This stabilization is seen in both South Korean education and also in its society. While gay studies have built a strong following in the country and also a genuine interest, the nomadic beginnings regarding sex and its meanings have taken a backseat on a high-speed detour led primarily by feminism and second-wave feminists in the country. Instead of seeking to understand sexual differences, humans have altogether become subjects in almost perfect Foucaultian identity formation, by which "…a subject is subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscious or self-knowledge" (Foucault 1982: 777-78). The idea that gendering is fundamental to who we are as people is clear, however, such ethical thinking in academia does not seem to apply to bisexuals in South Korea. What we have found here is that bisexuals are present in South Korea and this does not fit with the normalization of queer or even sexual studies in the country. Bisexuals are not only stigmatized by the constant need to either assert themselves as something that they are not—heterosexual, homosexual, or some blend thereof—but are also ignored in terms of the sexual agency roles they may play that goes beyond pedestrian notions of bipolarities.

Conclusion

> D.H. Lawrence had the impression—that psychoanalyisis was shutting sexuality up in a bizarre sort of box painted with bourgeois motifs, in a kind of rather repugnant artificial triangle, thereby stifling the whole of sexuality as a production of desire so as to recast it along entirely different lines, making of it a 'dirty little secret', a dirty little family secret, a private theater rather than the fantastic factory of nature and production.
> Gilles Deleuze, An Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1983)

South Korea's ideas regarding sex, sexual change, sexual identity, and all things sexual should be seen as an academic wet dream for gender, sexuality, identity, post-colonial, post-Confucian, and modernization scholars around the world. There is something ultimately worthy in endeavoring to understand such complexity in simple or even pedestrian terms, but simplicity can often be mistaken for accuracy. And with this in mind, this thesis initially set out to do just that. In doing so, however it found that the queer rubric simply does not have the capacity as yet to deal

with the dynamic interspersed reality of sex, the act, sex, the idea, sex, the gender, and sex, the mystery in South Korea. However, it did so in earnest and came up with the following conclusions to the questions that initiated the research itself.

First, though only a cursory investigation of bisexuality in the country, this research showed that the view of bisexuality as a sexual identity is intensely one of intimacy rather than simply connected to whether a man chooses to have erotic sexual relations with both men and women. In doing so, it also challenges Cho's findings regarding the dual lives that gays live. It is genuinely important to consider whether his gays are the South Korean *geis* as mentioned above and whether the inclusion of bisexuality would change the notions of gay sexual identities in the country. With the findings regarding bisexuality, should not intimacy in such calculations regarding the study of sexual identities as oppose to simple blanketed adoption of those identities by a certain community matter? This research argues that bisexuality must be considered in South Korea's sexual identity studies; the bisexual identity that exists here is a matter of intimacy not simply of the male genitalia.

Second, this research found that when bisexuals differentiate themselves from other sexualities in the country, they do so in accord with a perceived queer rubric that is neither indigenous nor wholly appropriate. In some ways, it is virtually impossible to adopt the fixed bisexual ideals that have been adopted in countries like the US. This is primarily because gay and straight are ideals that are premised on concepts of masculinity, i.e. codified & often socially prescribed behaviors. As mentioned above, though South Korea has readily accepted concepts such as gay/ homosexual, straight/ heterosexual, and bisexuality, the intrinsic attributes that typically define these identities form within non-Korean (often Western) countries, and may not even exist in South Korea. From the research above, for example, even sexual contact and its relationship to intimacy throws such generic categorical analysis out. In the case of the bisexuals interviewed, intimacy played more of a role in their sexual identity choices than did comparing themselves within a homo-heterosexual divide.

Third, beyond the homo-heterosexual paradigm, which has proven a major obstacle for bisexual representation in the country, the lack of addressing sexual orientation in education, the petrifying notion of sexual ostracism in the military, and the idea of fulfilling a familial responsibility while protecting oneself financially are real issues that make both bisexuality a viable and impossible identity to accept. As such, much more information is necessary to really understand if these social obstacles themselves have led to the need of person's with particular sexual behavioral intimacies to choose certain sexual identities over others. Particularly, in the wake of media censorship, an assault and ban on the definitive source for sexual exploration for youth in the country, coupled with an all-male compulsory military duty, create an environment in which the effects on sexual behavior and identity formation cannot be overlooked. Not only could

such a consideration build an additional layer of understanding in gender studies, but it could also lead to revolutionary ideas regarding the interpretation of sex, the act, in general.

And last, the existence of bisexuality has long been overlooked in quests to understand what has often been misappropriated as gay, lesbian, or gay/lesbian-specific issues. This omission has led to a genuine disregard for the "B" (and the "T") of these so-called LGBT+XYZ movements.[7] With this in mind, political movements to eradicate and protect against discrimination and social ills such as rape—that is only recognized between a man (the assailant) and woman (the victim) in South Korea—or human rights & forced military conscription—where proving one's gay exclusivity is virtually impossible—begs the question of whether sex-based politics and academia have flown the nest of reality. Queer studies is a new and fast developing academic discipline in South Korea, one that has from its outset been imprisoned and disciplined within and often by feminism and feminists in the country. As such, sexual identity, power politics, and citizenship matter more than, and even negate any regard of or interest in the notions of sex, the act, which often constitutes these identities. While promoting the idea of sexual equality, awareness, and protection, the academic ejaculation that should be building has instead led to a modernization-directed, semi-tumescence of ideas and effort.

The full appreciation of both the uniqueness, and even the lack thereof, of the South Korean experience is an essential one that can change how we analyze and understand the connection between sexual behavior and sexual identity. By studying bisexuality, which is arguably a nascent sexual identity in the country, it was possible to momentarily break free of the homo-heterosexual/ gay-straight divides, while still working somewhat within the vicinity of these weakly developed sexual binaries in South Korea. However, much research needs to be done in terms of how the interpretation of sexual behavior, not simply sexual identities, impacts society. In particular, more research in terms of male-male relations of intimacy in South Korea could provide a new interpretation of *gei* as well as ultimately enhance consideration and understanding of bisexuals in the country. Such work could prove valuable in breaking free from the "bizarre sort of box" that binds sexuality, finding the queers, and really getting at the inner workings of Deleuze's fantastic factory.

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Notes

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1. Prepared for the 6th Next-Generation Global Workshop and 1st KUASU International Conference: “Revisiting the Intimate and Public Spheres and the East-West Encounter” Jan. 11-13, 2014.
2. The author takes full responsibility for any errors or indiscretions. Please direct all inquiries to: rchrist1@snu.ac.kr.
3. It has been argued that bisexuality is not a gendered subject primarily because its members must be seen along a continuum vacillating between homosexuality or heterosexuality. However, I would argue here that the lack of gendered context in which bisexuals can prove the performative qualities necessary for gender-fication does not itself lead outright to gender-fictation nor lack of research value in terms of sexuality, sexual orientation, or sexual identity of bisexuals. Instead, I agree with Foucault’s claim that the dissolution of Victorian “...triple edict of taboo, nonexistence, and silence,” and the subsequent discourse of sex, including bisexuality, allows for its place in the ontological realm of sexual identity. (Michel Foucault’s The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, p. 5.).
4. Not to be confused with temporal-based reflexive cosmopolitanism. See Ulrich Beck & Natan Sznaider “Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a research agenda” in *The British Journal of Sociology* 2006. Vol. 57: 1.
5. Note on notations: H (Heterosexual); B (Bisexual); G (Gay) + the number assigned to the interviewee. For full demographic information see Appendix A.
6. See http://www.law.go.kr/법령/공무원보수규정
7. The term Queer is the umbrella term most accepted for all sexual and gender/ gendered minorities that do not fit within either the heteronormative or the gender-binary (hetero-homosexual) paradigms, though homosexuals are also included. The term, however, is not

without controversy since the word "queer" was employed as an anti-gay epithet in the 1990s. In its place, many fronts have chosen to employ the acronym: LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender). Such attempts at political correctness have led to a proliferation of added letterings: LGBTI (to include Intersex), LGBTQ (the Q for all exceptions), and even LGBTIH (the H for Hijra to include an Indian minority). And even more recently in South Korea, some have pushed for an LGBTAIQ rendering in which 'A' represents Asexual and 'Q', "Questioner," to mean a person who has yet to decide. Clearly, such identity distinctions set the stage for sub-level discrimination within and between sexual minorities. For this reason, I reclaim the term Queer (as was done in the early 2000s) as the all-inclusive label for sexual minorities.

Appendix A:

ID	AGE	EDU	MIL	REL	FAM	SEX ID	1ST EXP	FEM REL	MAL REL	UNPROT	SNS #	ON	MIL P	REC
B1	24	C(3)	X	X	1 B(26) M+F: A:M	B/G	M:F 15: 14	O (1); 1Y	O (2); ?	O	MA (?)	4	N/A	X
B2	26	C(GRAD)	X	O (BUD)	1 B(24) M+F: A:M	B/H	M:F 16: 16	O (2); 1Y; 8MO	O (1); 1Y	O	12	17 (?)	X	O
B3	21	C(2)	X	O (CAT)	2 S(33;35) M+F: A:M	B	M:M 13:?	0 (2); 2Y; 4MO	O (MA); ?	X	MA (?)	MA (?)	N/A	O
B4	23	H(GRAD)	O	X	2 B (18; 25) M: A:S	B/H	M:F 13:14	O (3); 1 Y; ?	X	O	MA(?)	MA(?)	X	X
B5	21	C(1)	X	O (BUD)	N/A M+F: A:M	B	M:M 15: 18	X	X	X	MA (?)	8	N/A	O
G1	24	C(4)	X	X	1 B(29) M+F: A:M	G	M:M 17: ?	X	X	X	5 (?)	2	N/A	O
G2	20	C(1)	X	O (CAT)	1 S (26) M+F: A:M	G	M:M X	O (1); 6 MO	O (3); 3MO	X	MA (?)	3	N/A	X
G3	25	C(4)	O	O (CAT)	1 S (23) M+F: A:M	G	M:M 17:19	O(MA); ?	X	O	?	MA(?)	X	O
G4	22	C(3)	X	X	N/A M+F: A:M	G	M:M 12: 15	X	X	X	?	X	N/A	O
G5	23	C(2)	X	O (CHR)	1 B(17) M+F: A:M	G	M:M 9:10	O(1); 1Y	O(2); 3MO; 1Y	X	MA(?)	MA(?)	N/A	X
H1	23	C(3)	X	X	1 B(18) M+F: A:M	H	M:F 17:16	O(1); 1Y	X	X	5 (?)	3	X	O
H2	25	C(4)	X	X	N/A M+F: A:M	H	M:F 19:19	O(1); 2Y	X	O	X	3	N/A	O
H3	27	C(GRAD)	O	X	N/A M+F: A:M	H	M:F 20:?	O(MA); ?	X	O	6	MA (?)	X	O
H4	24	C(3)	O	?	1 B(17) M+F: A:M	H	M:F 20	O (1); 1 MO	X	X	X	1	X	O
H5	20	C(1)	X	O (CHR)	2 S(33;35) M+F: A:M	H	M:F 20	X	X	X	X	1	X	O

TABLE 1: Interview Demographics and Basic Responses

-EDU=Education (C=College; H=High School)

-MIL=Military Service (O=Served; X=Not Served)

-REL=Religion (O=yes; X=none; BUD=Buddhist; CAT=Catholic; CHR=Christian)

-FAM:=Family Structure (S=Sister; B=Brother; M-F=Mother & Father; A=Live Together=M=Parents are Married; S=Parent is Single)

-SEX ID=Sexual Identification (B=Bisexual; G=Homosexual; H=Heterosexual)

-1st EXP= First Experience (M= Male; F=Female)

-FEM REL= Relationship with a Female (O=yes; X=no; Y=year; MO=Month)

-MAL REL= Relationship with a Male

-UNPROT= Unprotected Sex

-SNS #= How many times one has met someone using online or smart technology applications?

-ON= One-night Stands

-MIL P: Military Punishment for Sex-Related Behavior

-MA: Multiple Accounts

-REC: Allowed for voice recording

ID	AGE	SEX ID	Has alcohol played a role in your having had sex and (how often?)	When did you start and how often did you do Online Porn?	Do you believe others pressure you to get married or have a girlfriend?	Did your brothers or sisters play a role in why you chose your sexuality?
B1	24	B/G	Yes (4)	MIDDLE (3/ WK)	O	O
B2	26	B/H	Yes (?)	MIDDLE (?)	O	X
B3	21	B	Yes (1)	MIDDLE (OFTEN)	O	O
B4	23	B/H	Yes (10+)	MIDDLE (?)	O	X
B5	21	B	Yes (2)	MIDDLE (?)	X	N/A
G1	24	G	No	MIDDLE (OFTEN)	X	X
G2	20	G	Yes (1)	MIDDLE (NOT OFTEN)	O	X
G3	25	G	Yes (10+)	MIDDLE (OFTEN)	O	X
G4	22	G	Yes (2)	MIDDLE (?)	X	N/A
G5	23	G	Yes (5+)	MIDDLE (?)	O	X
H1	23	H	No	MIDDLE (OFTEN)	X	X
H2	25	H	Yes (10+)	MIDDLE (OFTEN)	X	N/A
H3	27	H	Yes (5+)	MIDDLE (OFTEN)	O	N/A
H4	24	H	No	MIDDLE (OFTEN)	O	X
H5	20	H	No	MIDDLE (?)	X	X

Appendix B: